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THE INDEPENDENT PRESS IN THE EMERGING DEMOCRACIES: THE CASE
STUDIES OF PQLAND, UKRAINE AND RUSSIA
Lyudmyla Pustelnyk, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 2007
My research will entail the election coverage in the mainstream papers of Poland,
Ukraine and Russia, these are the Gazeta Wyborcha, the Den, and the Izvestiya
respectively. The diverse levels of media-freedom in the observed countries explain the
difference between all three ,oµtlets in featuring political issues. The purpose of this
,)

Master's Thesis is to contrast and compare the state of the free press in Poland, Ukraine
and Russia as well as the factors that determine the media-independence. In particular,
these are the media-legislation, civil society and the e. conomic performance.
This study revises the empirical claims made by Price and Krug (2000) that emphasize
the interaction of laws and socio-cultural environment as the major determinants of the
press freedom. I present evidence that suggests that the direction of causation runs from
the institutionalized civil society to the established phenomenon of the free press. Other
findings show the diverse imef,!tt of the legislation in press freedom since this variable
has to be dropped into three groups of the media-related laws: those that determine the
issue of ownership, access to information and media responsibility. My study promises to
advance our empirical understanding of how the independent variables impact the
development of the free press ·and to extend theoretical approaches to defining the
balanced coverage as the key indicator of the media independence.
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INTRODUCTION

The Research Question
The freedom of speech is one of the basic freedoms; it distinguishes the democratic
society from the authoritarian. Thus, media freedom belongs to the dominant themes in
post-communist development. In the same way as the independent press is considered to
be the essential part of democratic society existence, democracy is not possible without
the free press. This paper investigates how democracy determines the independence of
media through the issues of legislation, economic performance and civil society. The
research question explains the necessity of the institution of the free press in the emerging
1.

.

democracy and provides the material for better understanding of democratization in postcommunist countries. it shows the importance of the media in communication and in
setting the political agendas, and as the primary agents in the erosion of democratic
values.

Background
In May 1989, after the former opposition party Solidarity came to power in Poland,
Adam Michnik, the chief editor of the opposition paper Gazeta Wyborcha, wrote his

,,.

famous editorial about the futufe relationship between Polish media and government. The
editorial ran that journalists' supported the opposition while struggling against the
communist rule but since the Solidarity leaders themselves became the leaders of the
state, the new way of communication between the journalists and the politicians must be
set. Gazeta Wyborcha declared its intentions to be critical towards the newly elected
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democratic government. It called. the top officials to meet the journalists' criticism in
accordance to the norms of the open society where media are recognized as the watch
dogs of democracy.
Within more than two decades that passed after the mentioned publication Polish
press, went through the series of transformations that finally led to the establishment of
the free media in the country. The democratic changes in Poland contributed to the status
of the press as the indepei:ident player in politics. It has become the remarkable feature of
the recent political history in'Poland that the cabinets' members were dismissed after the
disclosing publications about them appeared in the press. Why did Polish media succeed
in the transformation from the tool of propaganda under communist rule into the free
media in new Poland?· Why was this transformation less successful in the other formerly
communist countries ofEastem Europe? To answer these questions one has to look at the
nature of the relationship between the government and press in post-totalitarian society.
In the authoritarian political system, media are assumed to be the channels of
dissemination of the governm'ental policy. Therefore their position must not contradict
1

the decisions of top-officials; public opinion is shaped in the way to support authorities.
The absence of media criticism is one of the rules of the game but not an issue of choice as it becomes when the democratic transition begins. After this the relationship between
the government and media changes dramatically. The loyalty towards the government is
not a necessary condition anymore; people in power lose their status of the primary and
only sources of political information. However, the press does not obtain its freedom with
these changes. The economic issue is a key factor: since the government ceases to be the
I

I

financial provider of the outlets, the latter face the problem of survival. Through fostering
/ ,·
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the market of advertisement economic reforms seem to give media chances to earn
money. Nevertheless, few outlets can survive from advertisement during the transitional
period, and the old model of the servile position of media in respect to political leaders
persists. In this case media in4ependence is rather an issue of governmental rhetoric than
an issue of concern. The lack ,of democratic institutions that determine the develop�ent
of free press enables such a �ituation. Its further development that may result either in
the backslide from democracy or the trend towards it, finally drives to the partisan media
in the first case or to the free press in the second.
The status of media is different in the political system where the democratic rules of
the game are already established. The outlets are separated from political pressures which
means that parties do not view 'media as their counterparts. As Rosen (1997) put it, "[t]he
American press became independent from political parties back in the nineteenth century,
..

and' originally 'independence· in journalism' meant exactly that" (1997, 88). Media
scholars list several major factors that contributed to the decline of parties' influence on
the press. Among those, according to Davis (1994, 9), was loosing the parties' power as a
linking mechanism between tli:e elected officials and citizens. News media have filled this
vacuum and since' then played the greater role in the elections campaign. They offered
political plurality and handicapped the candidates by reporting their wrongdoings. This
afforded the press to achieve two goals: it became capable of influencing political process
and. contributing to the gre'ater involvement of public into this process; the press also
obtained its financial background by making profits from the news coverage. Both
political and press-related issues stimulated the emergence of the independent news
media. The former included the rise and fall of political party organization, the decrease
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of partisan affiliation in vot�r�� choice and growing democratization of elections. Among
the latter were the developmerit of professional journalism and the rise of penny press.
The penny press represented·. definitely new phenomenon in the media industry. While
partisan outlets were driven by ideology, penny press was led by the commercial profit.
These papers developed the modem concept of news and demonstrated the novel
approach to the coverage of political events. The latter were reported daily as the news
reflecting political affairs devoid of the propagandist load. Consequently, the media task
was not to create the public opinion in the way the party considered it necessary but to
make the public aware ab6u't1'what was going on in politics. This made the press the
primary actor in the communication process between the voters and the ruling elites.
The experience of Americ'an media can be seen as unique in terms of the way they
distinguished themselves from other political actors· and created the new environment for
the dialogue with· the ruling· elite. The example of American press is often used as a
paragon for the emerging i independent media in the formerly totalitarian societies.
Nevertheless, this model is not always compatible with the reality of post-communist
countries. Here the rise of free outlets is significantly impeded by the heritage of the old
,4�,

regime that imposes the rules of the game of the previous system. From this prospective,
/ .

it is important to look at the history of Russian press whose development became
paradigmatic in many respects for the media situation in other formerly Soviet republics.
During the Soviet era Russian print media enjoyed high circulations due to the system
of governmental financing. The idea of the profitability of the outlets never was an issue
in the USSR. The press served as the vehicle of propaganda but not information. It was a
regular practice that more than a half of the newspaper's area was devoted to the official

' ..,,

5
statements of the communist leaders. The collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to this
system. The period of Gorbachov's perestroika w3:s the most promising for the emerging
free press; the governmental control and censorship diminished, while the economic
pressures had not come yet.· Press contributed greatly to glasnost (openness) by
publishing disclosing materials about Stalinist repressions and corruption among the top
officials in Soviet republics. At the same time, the system of the state subsidies vanished
forcing many outlets to close down, particularly those that appeared before Russia
declared its state independence and claimed to be the first Russian free media. Other
papers and magazines were :owned by the members of staffs and chief editors. The
financial background of these outlets was very unstable, as most of them had large
external debts. In the mid-1990s, the situation changed after the new class of Russian
businessmen appeared. Soon after the merging of business and political elites led to the

,,,

redrawing of the media own�rship landscape. The presidential campaign of 1996 has
become a turning point: political role of media increased since the participants of
elections us.ed the ouHets for dissemination of their ideologies. By the end of 1990-s the
media-wars in Russia were the most extreme; negativism towards political rivals and
biased reporting were the .d. efining
features of the media coverage. The majority of
'
broadcast and print media got new owners, who demanded extensive personal coverage
and loyalty in exchange for financial support. The economic dependency of media led to
their political dependency. Thus far if the outlet was critical towards the authorities this
.,

did not obligatory mean that it:was critical by itself but rather expressed the position of its
owner. The situation was demonstrated by TV channels and papers that were the parts of
Vladimir Gusinski and Boris Berezovski media-empires. Soon after the change of the

6
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Kremlin hierarchy, when Vl,adimir Putin became Russian president, the major media
,1
.
oligarchs like those mentioned came under direct criticism as manipulators of public
'

opinion. This was understood �s a warning signal by other media-magnates; their outlets
have gradually subdued criticism towards government and adopted a pro-Kremlin line.
After Gusinski and.Berezovski lost their businesses and fled the country, the major slices
of their media-holdings changed owners. Currently, the giant energy enterprise Gazprom
owns the majority of the mainstream media; Gazprom's pro-Putin position resulted in
homogeneously-partisanship coverage of governmental activities.
. ·.·
Though the mentioned 'media do not offer their readers the diversity of political
opinions they are profitable· and have high circulations, They accepted the Western
business-model in media-industry but not the Western watch-dog philosophy. The
independent medi� in Russia can count only a few titles and there is a low probability that
the segment of the free press will be increased. Within the recent period Russia has
demonstrated the· signifi,cant backslide from democracy; th� majority of outlets are
influenced by the key political and financial players. 'Since the government is a major
political actor the media-situation in Russia is state-orchestrated. Thus the outlets cannot
be perceived as an arena ot�ublic debate and can not effectively serve as means of
j

•

·,

communications. Journalists' �oncern about the existing condition of media-issues is far
too low from reaching the critical point and being able t� change the situation.
The same or similar model of the relationship between media and state persists in the
majority of the former Soviet republics. It can be seen as the significant obstacle for the
democratic transitions since the lack of media freedom affects many areas of political
'

'

life. In particular, when media simply spread the balanced information they make people

' ' .·
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better educated about politics, as well as their rights as the citizens. By giving voice for
people media can _increase the level of their political participation.
Media can also serve as the
. restraining mechanism. against the misuse of authority.
Through keeping an eye on the top actors and reporting about their bad performance, the
indypendent press contributes. to the rotation of people in power; the outlets can prevent

·�'.
l"

.

the wrong candidates from being elected or appointed to the leading posts. Free press
)

may protect human rights and provide a powerful control on corruption (Aymo Brunetti
and Beatrice Weder, 2002). In this way media can promote a rule of law where it is not
established yet. By_gamering opposition for the governmental policies media can play the
important role in economy: As Roumeen Islam (2002) sees it, there is a strong correlation
between the economic development of the country and the media independence. Finally,
the establishment of the free 'media indicates that the country will rather follow the
democratic path of developme�t than tum back to the previous system.
. t

The next chapter will ofilir the review of the scholarly literature about the press
independence and the factors that contribute to this issue.

··Literature Review
Media laws arid the ownership determine the media freedom which is seen as the
dependent variable by Monr9e Price and Peter Krug (2000), Simeon Djankov ed al
(2001), Doris Graber (1996),.Ireneush Kaminski (2000) and Marcus Alexander (2003). In
particular, Price and Krug ardue against the concept that laws are separately advocated
"for the creation of effective ahd democracy-promoting media"(2000, 1 ). They look at
laws as those affected by the cluster of the activities in each society because even the
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most progressive media legislation can not guarantee the development of the free press.
What really matters is an i1ieraction between the law and socio-cultural environment.
There are numerous factors that make effective laws work on the one hand, and there are
various conditions that diminish their role on the other. Price and Krug provide the
analysis of laws in the media-related areas, they use the example of the US where laws
prohibited monopolies and anti-competitive conduct in the media sphere as well: "A
society might find a concentration of power in the field of speech more troubling than a
concentration of power in a field with less consequence for democratic values" (2000, 9).
The effectiveness of law is m�asured through the separation of powers, independence of
. }:

the judiciary and regulatory bddies that are loyal or not to the enunciated legal principles.
The state ownership for the media tends to be more dangerous for their independence
than the private.' Price and Krug stress upon the necessity of increasing of the private
ownership of the media in transition societies. In particular, they speak about the foreign
ownership for the media .an:d the state ownership. The foreign ownership may have
diverse impact on the press 'freedom in transition societies while the state ownership may
be seen as the block for free ·press development. On the one hand, a restriction for the
foreign ownership may be deri'ved from the war times and reflect the fear that media can
. .�
.

'

'

be used for propaganda purpokes. However, on the other hand, in transition societies the
foreign ownership can tie a useful alternative to the governmental control over media.
State ownership, according to Price and Krug, often means not only the established
practice of censorship and other kinds of antidemocratic practices but also the pervasive
situation in the media market. As it happened in 1999, when the Croatian parliament
allowed the state broadcaster · to expand the number of advertising minutes it was

/'
''·
.. ,
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permitted to sell. The advertising market was limited, and the lack of revenues from
advertisement resulted in poor economic state of independent media.
The scholars Djankov, McLeish, Nenova, and Shleifer research the question of the
negative consequences of the state ownership for the free press development too. The
state of the press freedom is the dependent variable. It is measured through the level of
criticism towards governmerital
, bodies, the level of the investigative reporting, and the
economic independence of the media. The issue of the ownership, which is the
independent variable, is measured through the degree of the state control over the press.
After examining the cases· of 97 countries Djankov, McLeish, Nenova and Shleifer
conclude "that countries wit�' more prevalent state ownership of the media have less free
press, fewer political rights for the citizens, inferior govemance"(2001, 29). They see the
private ownership of the media as the prescription for the independent press. Djankov,
McLeish, Nenova and Shleife.r use the example of Kenya where privately owned press

.., . '

investigated a public corruption case. The state-owned press defended the accused
government officials. In Ghana new privately owned media resulted in greater criticism
of the government.
However, Djarlkov ed al do not analyze the reverse side of the private ownership of
the media. Though Ukraine:, Russia and Italy are included into their study, they did not
°

mention about the established practice of private ownership of the press by political and
financial players there. The l�tter usually have strong both formal and informal links to
the governmental bodies.

This

phenomenon has negative consequences for the press

freedom because the newspap�rs often serve as the tools in media-wars between political
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players. Thus the private o�ership for the med.ia in the emerging democracies is not
always supportive for media-treedom.
, '.
I.!
In this respect Graber (1996) makes an important observation. Stressing on the
ownership as a key issue in the relationship between media independence and politics,
she does not idealize the private ownership as a shi�ld against political pressures. On the
one hand the news production· in the US is owned by a small number of companies, and
this does not lead to the prevention of diverse viewpoints to reach the public. On the
other, when the news prograo:is merge with entertainment ones there is a risk that "the
quality of civic life in the ,J.Jnited States will be impaired" (1996, 46). The state
regulations limit concentratiop' of media in one hands but there is almost no competition
between the newspapers in most American cities. Graber summarizes that American
media can not s��e the public interest of a democratic society completely but only in
some part.
Derived from this the question of which form of ownership is more supportive for the
media independence remains opened in the writings of the mentioned authors: the
ownership can not explain su�ficiently what conditions are needed for the development of
the free press.
Kaminski (2000) and Ale��der (2003) view media legislation as the determinant of
media freedom. In accordance with Price and Krug, Kaminski argues that even the
progressive laws"can not guarantee media independence. He observes changes in Polish
legislation within 1996-2000 and applies them to several cases of the abuse of freedom of
expression. Current Polish' media laws do not prevent the attempts to violate their
independence of press and TV. In particular, the Broadcasting Act of 1992 was designed

• v
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to guarantee a balanced management of public media and to separate them from the
influence of governmental structures. On the other hand, the legislation allowed the
men:ibers of the parliamentary parties to be the top executives in the National Council on
the broadcast issues and thus to provide governmental policy in the media sphere. When
in September 1999 Polish president Kwasniewski's controversial behavior during the
public ceremony (due to being drunk, according to the witnesses) was widely covered by
the press, public TV and radio remained silent about this event. They mentioned the
controversy after a couple of days. This reporting caused the chairman of the National
Council to make �he statement; it demanded explanations from the editorial boards of
television and radio.
_ Another case 'concerns the print media. According to the Articles 31-33 of the Press
Act of 1984, individuals, priv�te bodies and other organizations should have standing to
apply for corrections and replies in case they consider the print medium published

..

inaccurate information aboudhem. It is expected, though not guaranteed by the law that
the state institutions, unlike natural persons, have to accept criticism without a demand
for corrections and replies. Ne·vertheless, the case of president Kwasniewski against the
paper Zycie (The �ife) in 1997 turned out to be ground-breaking both for legal practice
and the relationship between the state and media. Zycie published a well-documented
article in which statecl that "i<.wasniewski had happened to be a high rank former KGB
agent. The authors of the arti�le asked the president's comments on the findings before
the publication appeared, but' the president refused comment. After the publication,
-:,•,·

Kwasniewski instituted the proceedings for civil libel and demanded from the paper a
compensation of over 700 000 US dollars for the moral damage.

12
Both cases demonstrate that legislation is barely an effective tool for protecting a
media freedom in the society where democratic rules are not established yet, as it was in

'

(
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the case of Poland. When democratic rules are lacking, the elite assumes media to be the
counterpart of the governmental policy despite the promulgated legal framework that
separates state bodies from the print and broadcast outlets. However, laws can also be
designed in a way . to limit media independence. Alexander elaborates on the case of the
Russian Internet media and how they are regulated by legislation that poses a number of
restrictions for the freedom of speech. The Roskominform Statute, the laws On
Databases, On Communication� On Information and On Information Exchange were used
by the government as vehicl��)n dealing with the challenges of the IT revolution. Finally,
i•

they "set the precedent of go�Jrnment's justification for active control of the Internet by
the process of registration" · (2003, 8). In addition, according to the laws, Russian
governmental bodies have to monitor and guide the development of the Internet in the
country. Such legal practices resulted in the pro-government position of the majority of
Russian e-media and the absence of political plurality in the Russian Internet.
Kaminski and Alexander show that laws may have different effects in the state of
media freedom. However, the�e findings do not throw light on the question why it was
I

,,,

possible to adopt media-suppottive legislation in Poland, while Russian laws created the
hostile environment for freedofu of expression. In other words, what are the additional
factors that contributed to the ·existing situation? Studying the writings of both authors
one can conclude that the advance towards democratization in the case of Poland and
movement away from democracy in Russia can both be explained by the weakness of
civil society in Russia and the traditions of its existence in Poland. Though there is rich
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scholarly literature on civil society development in post-communist countries,
surprisingly few attempts have been done to establish the link between civil society and
media freedom. 1:'aking into consideration that civil society and free media are closely
related to democratization, it can be stated that the causal relationship between civil
society and the independence of press and TV also exists.
The same link betwee� economic performance of the country and media
.

,,.-

independence can also be established. Scholars acknowledge the role of free press in
economic development (Roumeen Islam, 2002; Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder,
2002; Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson, 2004) but do no discuss how the economic
growth can facilitate 'the necessary background for media independence. Though the
successful economic performance as one of the outcomes of democratic transition is
related to free press.
The mentioned gaps in �he- literature can be. explained by the lack of connection
between media scholars and_.political
science. The result of this, in turn, is that the
"'
relationship between media and democracy is not adequately explored.

The Dependent Variable and the Independent Variable
In this paper the independence of national press is seen as the dependent variable.
Media legislation_ is the independent variable.
The print media was taken as the object of study for the reason of the importance of its
impact in public opinion. Unli!ce broadcast media; the print journalism not only delivers
the news to the audience but presents the wider spectrum in its coverage. In particular,
' ,4

'

reports, columns, opinion writings, pamphlets, cartoons, and pictures can be viewed as
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powerful tools in shaping images and forming views. The press is the oldest and the most
traditional among the existing media, and "the newspaper circulation is at all times high"
(Davis 1994, 11). Besides, in Jome cases the press remains the only source of information
(some rural areas in Ukraine a�d Russia).
Media laws provide the legal framework for regulating media-industry through the
issues of ownership, access to information, and the responsibility of the media. The
dominance of certain type of the media-ownership (state, private, other) determines the
degree of media independence of the political or governmental bodies. These structures
can hinder the media activity by prohibiting the learning and the dissemination of certain
kinds of information. In this respect the laws that define the procedures of access to
•

. ,j"

information as well as those determining what information contains the state secret are
significant. Whether or not the laws oblige media to cover certain events and figures
indicates the degree of media freedom too. The media-freedom is also determined by the
laws regulating· the outlets' activities within elections. These laws may or may not put
certain limits on election coverage: For instance, the laws can forbid the use of evaluation
judgments while featuring candidates or journalists' comments on the party programs.
The legal regulations of media-responsibility are important as well, since the severity
1

of punishments for violation'. of the law affects the independence of outlets.

"·

l

The Additional Explanatory Variables
The legislation, if taken alone, can not explain the degree of media freedom. Its
interaction with other 'variables provides the media laws with more explanatory power.
Thus far civil society development and economic performance will be discussed as the

I

t
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additional explanatory variables. There is a correlation between all three explanatory
variables. Through the issue of ownership the · legislation is related to the economic
performance. In furn,' the economic growth impacts the issue of media-readership: the
more stable the citizens' well being, the more likely they are to purchase or subscribe for
the press. The readership, as Robert Putnam (1993) states in Making Democracy Work, is
one of the measurements of the civil society.
The media-industry is sensitive to the economic growth or decline. The latter
undermines financial background of media and exposes them to the external influences.
On the contrary, the economic progress of the country gives more opportunities for media
independence. In particular, the state loses its monopoly for the media-related industry.
Among those are the paper-producing enterprises and the services of the printing houses.
These industries are represented by the one or a few enterprises in the beginning of
economic transition. But with the development of the market their number increases,
which also lowers the media-expenditures for the mentioned services.
The economic growth contributes to the expansion of the media-market: new outlets
appear; this, in turn, develops plurality of opinion� in featuring political and social
phenomena. The vibrant civil society can serve as the effective mechanism against
governmental influences on the media. Citizens' concern about media issues can be
expressed in different forms of protest against the incumbents. (For instance, petitions,
demonstrations or voting against certain political figures within elections). To be
organized, the civil society groups are interested in the outlets that are alternative to those
affiliated with the state. The · groups themselves may become the founders of the
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independent papers. Finally, the developed civil society creates an environment in which
the abuse of the media freedom is not tolerated.
In the following chapter I zjn going to look at the cases of Poland, Ukraine and Russia
as those with similar patteriis 1of democracy development that produced diverse effects in
media freedom.

,

The Cases of Poland, Ukraine and Russia

The three mentioned countries passed the period of transformation from communist
rule to developing dembcracy. They share the significant commonalties and differences
that were· considered while' selecting the cases for this paper. The geographical
neighborhood of Poland, Ukraine and Russia and their common communist past enable
,,.,t,.

the author of this paper to discuss some similarities in post-communist development.
However, the interaction of so_me, and often the same political and economic issues in
Poland, Ukraine and Russia has produced diverse effects in their media-freedom. I am
going to discuss political and economic factors that determined the state of media in three
countries.
;

'

Leonid Kravchuk in Ukraine and Boris Yeltsin in Russia were the representatives of
the formerly ruling parties that became the first presidents of their countries. Both
Kravchuk and Yeltsin were h'olding posts in the communist government before being
1 ;,
elected the leaders of the states.· They took the liberal positions towards media during the
first years of the st!}tes' independence, both Ukrainian and Russian outlets enjoyed
relatively high degree of freedom. However, this was rather an issue of the informal and
unspoken agreeme· nt ·between the journalists and people in power. The necessary

1.
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watershed between media ahd politicians was not formalized in the beginning of the
democratic transitions. This contributed to the later dependence of the outlets on political
forces. The elections of the members of the old Soviet nomenclatura Leonid Kuchma in
Ukraine and Vladimir Putin in Russia as the second presidents made this dependence
even more evident. However, the Ukrainian regime was characterized as mildly
authoritarian, while in Russia it was more oppressive. Consequently, Ukrainian
journalists, though limited in performing their professional duties, could afford more
criticism towards the gove��nt than their Russian colleagues.

,,-,

The situation was not the· same in Poland. After the former opposition leader Lech
Valesa became the president, new media initiatives sprang up spontaneously. Those basic
ones concerned the press titles that previously belonged to the state. They were sold to
'

.

the private owners, including the forei gn ones; this led to the formalized separation
between politicians and media. The next Polish president, a formerly prominent figure of
the post-communist political left, Alexander Kwasn1ewski was criticized for his conflicts
with journalists and the attempts to control the press. Nevertheless, the old-regime
philosophy had no chance to �e imposed on the outlets since the independence of media
'rl

was the already existing factori:
Another · commonality between the three countries was their poor economic
performance in the initial stage of the democratic transition. Further implementation of
market reforms had various irtipacts in media-situation in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. In
Poland the economic changes were going faster than in Russia and Ukraine. In this
country private ownership for the small enterprises was not banned during the communist
era, unlike it was in Russia and Ukraine. The Polish economy was more prepared for the
;,,
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market model of functioning., While applied to the media-industry, this model produced a
press that was comp�titiv:e and capable of surviving without the financial involvement of
state. The majority of new media-publishers in Poland were from abroad, they brought
capital and know-how to the i?dustry. In the first tum new publishers were interested in
making the outlets profitable. •.l:I'his was achievable through providing media with modem
equipment and enhancement of the professional standards of journalists, which, in tum,
eliminated any role of political· influences on the media.
Russia and Ukraine share the commonality of the impeding role of the over-powerful
state in their economies. Previously the USSR-planned economy made its transition to
the market-based more problematic. The slow-moving state machine, and the gaps in
legislation· reform; impeded the process too. Further economic transformations in the
former Soviet republics caused the redistribution of the state property (and the media
market as part of it) betwe�il 'the financial oligarchy. The latter viewed the outlets as the
instruments of achieving political goals, profitability of the paper was not the primary
issue. Because the ownership.:related legislation was an issue of constant changes, foreign
publishers entered post-Soviet media-markets significantly later than in Poland. Thus it
took more time for Ukrainian and Russian press to get familiar with Westem media'

.

ideology. Currently foreign�owned press counts a list of outlets in Ukraine and a few in
Russia.
.

Comparing all three countrtes, the media-market definitely won in the process of
',1.

., . \_jl

transformations. A number of'new outlets appeared and found their audiences quickly,
among those are the Internet papers and glossy Western-like entertainment press.
However, Polish' media-market is much more diverse than its Ukrainian and Russian
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counterparts in terms of tl;te, 1�mtlets that conce� specifically political issues. In turn,
�,'.
Ukrainian media-market offer�' ,,its audience more variety of politically oriented press than
the Russian market does. Eveu with the stagnation of democratization during president
Kuchma's era the segment of opposition press, though narrow, existed in Ukrainian
media-market. It served as the alternative source of information and contributed to the
plurality of political thoughts. Meanwhile, Russia demonstrated the tendency of ousting
the opposition outlets from the market by both economic and political means.
The degree of citizens' concern about media-related issues also differs. The
1

underground outlets togetlier1 Jwith those published by the Catholic Church enjoyed
popularity in Poland during c�mmunist times. Polish tradition of the underground press
was prolonged from the times of anti-Nazi resistance. From the mid-1970s more than
1400 underground papers and· magazines were published, about half of these titles had the
regular circulation of hundreds of issues (Igor Potapov 2003, 3). The public reaction was
strong after the priest Popiehishko, also the author of the publications for the mentioned
press, was kidnapped and killed by the functionaries of the Ministry of Interior in 1984.
Though communist authorities· were interested in silencing Popielushko's case, public
.

,.

f
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disgust for the murder was ·p.owerful enough. Those responsible for the crime were
I t

sentenced to long imprisonnient before the beginning of the democratic changes in
Poland.
The underground press in Ukraine appeared on the mass scale in the mid-1980s but
enjoyed popularity only in Kyiv (the capital of Ukraine) and the western regions of the
country. The emergence of the Internet press in the mid-1990s somehow repeated the
phenomenon of the undergro�d press: The narrow use of the state media made people

.,,'
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search for credibility of unofficial sources of information. The online outlets appeared to
be such sources. The murder' of Georgiy Gongadze, the journalist of the online paper
Ukrainska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth) in 2000 caused a series of the mass demonstrations
in Ukraine against president Kuchma. The leader of tlie state was suspected in ordering
the crime. Though the president was not removed from the office before the end of his
term, the anti-Kuchma ca�J?aign contributed greatly to the success of the Orange
revolution in 2004 and the change of political regime. However, the case of Gongadze
still is not investigated.
The undergro�nd publications in Russia took the form of samizdat (self-published
materials. Within the Russian: printed underground, the documentary novel literature was
superior to the journalistic article. Several samizdat periodicals existed during the Soviet

.

'

era but did not have significant impact in public opinion, unlike the books by Alexander
Solzhenitsyn or Varlam Harlamov that wrote about the "closed" episodes of Soviet
i'

history. None of the formerlY'. ti?derground outlets were developed into the legal national
paper in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The murders of Russian opposition journalists within last two decades (among those
were Dmitriy Kholodov in 1998, Artem Borovik 'in 1999 and Anna Politkovskaya in
2006) were always widely discussed in the society. However, public outcry never took
any form of protest against the authorities. None of the cases of murdered Russian
journalists were investigated.
Consequently, a vigorb. �� press m Poland, somehow limited independence of
1�

Ukrainian print media, and cri/ically low degree of the press freedom in Russia present an
evidence about the diverse impact of democracy development in media. Though the
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initial stage of democratic changes was fast in all the observed cases, it later lagged
behind in Ukraine and Russia�: unlike in Poland. The democratization slowed down and
finally ceased in Russia. Cong�aling of the democratic reforms during the last decade in
Ukraine was broken by the Orange revolution in 2004. However, within 2005-2006
Ukraine significantly deviated from the promulgated democratic course. Essentially,
where Polish media is-characterized by a high degree of freedom, Ukrainian press can be
defined as partially independent, and Russian press shares the government's policy.

Hypotheses
1. I hyp othesize t_hat the media-friendly legislation is associated with more press freedom.
2. I expect that tlie developed civil society leads to the development of the free
media.·
3. I hyp othesize that the successful economic performance is related to the more
independent media.

Measurements, Data and Method
j,

.•

:

The media legislation 'will be measured through the effectiveness of laws in
'1(,

promoting guarantees for the 'tree press and its development. The content-analysis of the
laws related to the issues of ownership, access to information and media responsibility
will be done.
The civil society will be measured through the historical legacy and the level of the
self-organization of the society. The method of historical analyses will be applied. The

'
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following will be taken into_ consideration: the longitude of the democratic traditions in
the given country; the number ofNGOs and their effectiveness. The NGOs effectiveness
will be analyzed . through the significance of their achievements in the democratic
transformations. The ratings of the civil society development from the Freedom House
database will be compared. .
The economic performa�ce will be measured through the index of GDP and the level
of economic freedom. The relevant data will be taken from the annual report of Free the
',',

{

World organization and the Heritage Foundation.
To measure the press independence I am going to look at the issues of the
accountability of the press and the level of media criticism towards political figures.
Whether the media is acco;untable to the state organizations or political bodies or is
responsible in creating self-regulating institutions (ethic codes, charters, professional
NGOs) shows the level of their independence. The relevant data will be taken from the
databases of the professional journalists' organizations in Poland, Ukraine and Russia.
The level of media criti'ci�in will be analyzed as the one indicating the capability of
' .

the media to be the watch-dog of democracy. To what degree the press is critical towards
the key political actors determines the press freedom of the country.
In order to study the diverse degrees of media criticism towards political figures in
.

/

Poland, Ukraine and Russia ,I observed the coverage of the presidential elections of 2005
in Poland, of 2005 in Ukraine, and of 2004 in Russia. In all three countries, these
democratic elections indicated already established changes in the political situations.
There were two rounds in ea¢h of the elections, the representatives of the ruling camp
i � ,'

were nominated for presidenc§ in Poland, Ukraine and Russia. Elections are significant
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for my research since they are characterized by the highest scale of public opm10n
polarization and the sharpness of political conflicts. It is important to study how both are
reflected in the press. Elect��rs reveal the real role of the media in the society and show
r,".

how the press performs its functions. Thus the observation of the reports of the ongoing
events within electoral campaigns was focused on the texts related to the presidential
nominees. The following issues were addressed within observation: is the text laden with
the evaluation judgments about the presidential nominees and· are these judgments
separated from the �ews coverage? is the tone of publication negatively or positively
colored? are the ev�nts interpreted with equal distribution of the amount of data relevant
to political players or are so:tp.e of them mentioned in the outlet more frequently than
others? Based on these observations the performance of media functions is evaluated, and
the conclusion is done about· the medium: does it employ the same approach and
techniques towar1s all the key participants of the campaign and thus can it be considered
as an independent ,player in political process; or does the partisanship coverage indicate
that the paper mainly reflects the interests of the ruling political force.
The data were' taken from the mainstream daily papers the Gazeta Wyborcza (The
Electors' Paper, Poland), the Den (The Day, Ukraine), and the Izvestiya (The News,
Russia). The mentioned titl_es. ,- the Gazeta Wyborcza, the Jzvestiya, and the Den r

•. 1.,I •

were taken as the objects of study because of their status of the national papers read both
by the wide public and the political class. Each of the papers is one of the most influential
in its country and enjoys the large circulation; these papers are well established in the
media-markets and count the long periods of history. The longevity of the outlets'
existence is important for my research, since only the well-known papers have the most
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significant impact in public opinion. However, the pool of the outlets that could be
chosen for obse{vation · is significantly narrower in Ukraine than in Poland and is very
small in Russia. Such differentiation resulted from the political environments in the three
countries. Thus in Poland there ·is a number of the national independent papers, in
Ukraine the list of such outlets is rather short, in Russia the national papers that classify
themselves as the independent can be considered such only nominally, since the
institution of the free press does not exist in this country now.
To explain better why particularly Gazeta Wyborcza, the Den and the Izvestiya were
chosen as the objects of study, the necessary details about their background should be
provided. All the titles had the chance to acquire independence and assert their own
power. However, only Gazeta Wyborcza was capable of achieving these goals. In cases
of the Den and the Izvestiya, the inner logic of the transitional period led to the conflict
between reality and media's desire to be uncontrolled in their policies.
The Gazeta Wyborcza appeared as an outcome of the pact between the opposition
Solidarity party and the communist government in the Round Talk of 1989. The state
permitted the opposition to start a legal nation-wide ·paper. Initially, the Gazeta 's task
was to promote the Solidarit/s candidates in the upcoming election. After the opposition
won the elections, the Gazeta Wyborcza declared its independence from Solidarity. When
the paper promoted criticisn::i of President Walesa, the former leader of Solidarity, he tried
to fire the editor�in-chief, Adam Michnik. These attempts were not successful and
established the image of the paper as a non-partisan outlet.
Currently the Gazeta Wyborcza is owned by the journalists' staff; since 1993 it has an
·1·

investor - the American medb company Cox Enterprises.
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The Gazeta 's policy can be defined as keeping balance between information and
discussion, which means the paper is the main arena of the intellectual community in
Poland. At the same time the Gazeta Wyborcza is the top informer of the Polish audience;
it presents the coverage of events from all over th� country and the world. The circulation
'
{!
of the paper is 600 000 issues'.':
The Den was established by the journalists' staff in 1994. The founders proclaimed
their paper to be the first print outlet in Ukraine based strictly on the event-oriented
Anglo-American model. The paper stressed on the absence of any ties with the political
figures and its commitment to reflective, but at the same time intellectual, journalism.
The declared principles were followed by the paper within first seven months of its
existence. Then the editorial staff was dismissed under the dubious circumstances.
According to the formal explahation the journalists were in conflict with the editor-in
,_�·-.
chief Vasyl Ruban. Ruban said that his actions were
organized by the former KGB
.

.

general, Yevgen Marchuk, the top-executive of the Ukrainian Security Service at that
time. Ruban stated that' Marchuk followed the orders of the authorities that wanted to
make a tame paper from the Den. In support of Ruban's version is the fact that Larysa
lvshyna, the wife of Marchuk, has become the new editor-in-chief of the paper. Since
then, the Den has taken visi�ly loyal position towards the government and remains to be
uncritical towards any regime. Today the Den is owned the journalists of the paper.
,.

The paper's policy can be jut as informational-analytical oriented with the significant
{

'

dominance of analytical texts:•and opinion writings over the news coverage. Domestic
news are the priority while those from abroad are not covered on the regular basis. The
circulation of the paper is 200 000 issues.
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The Izvestiya has traditio�ally
enjoyed the wide readership during communist era and
'
.

continued to be one of the most popular papers in post- Soviet times. The paper played
the significant role in supporting the anti-communist opposition in Russia in the end of
the 1980s - beginning of 1990s. However, the economic obstacles put the Izvestiya, as ·
well as a number of other "old" nation-wide papers, on the possibility of closing down. In
February 1992 President Yeltsin signed a special decree about the state support for the
mentioned press. The decree appeared to be the temporary measure for the papers'
survival. It did not prevent the Izvestiya from falling into private hands though. In June
2005 the Izvestiya was bought by the energy giant Gazprom that reshuffled the senior
editorial staff of the paper. Gaiprom's close ties with l(remlin resulted in a change of the
paper's attitude towards, the Russian government. Since the takeover, the Izvestiya has
adopted clearly pro-Kremlin position.
Previously the 1zvestiya was known as the place for the discussions of experts on
various issues making it the favorite of intellectuals and academics. Opinions and
analyses of events still occupy the larger part of the newspaper's area. However, there is
no balance any more in giving voice to the different parties, like it was before the
•
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Izvestiya were added to th� J::iazprom's media. Information about the ongoing events

'·

takes less of the paper's page's:' news reporting mainly concerns the domestic issues and
some significant events from a�road. The circulation of the periodical is
250 000 copies.
The observation was done within four months prior to the date of elections. The
Gazeta Wyborcza was observed within December 1, 2004 - March, 28, 2005. I observed
the Den during September, 1, December, 30, 2005 and the Izvestiya during December, 1,
.,
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2003 - March, 30, 2004. These periods of time overlapped with the formal elections
campaign in each country (three months before the day of elections). In addition one
month before the start of the campaign was observed too in order to study the coverage of
the unofficial media-campaign. The observation · of. the latter is imperative for my
research since it allows tracing whether or not the media have political preferences and
'·

do they try to impose them o�:the media audience.
Based on the content-analysis of the newspapers' publications two methods of
defining media independence. will be applied. First is the political agenda setting offered
by the scholars Iyengar and Reeves (1997). The second is the index of impartiality
established by the author within observing the coverage of elections. The next passage
will elaborate on the two methods.
Iyengar and Reeves studied the process of media influence on public opinion and
concluded that it is determined by priming, or "the ability of the media agenda to affect
..

.

the ·criteria by which individuals judge issues" and framing, or "the subtle selection of
certain aspects of an issue by the media to make them more important and thus to
emphasize ·a particular· cause of some phenomena"· (1997, 235). Both priming and
framing consist the agenda-setting. While priming is more relevant to the amount of
.

.,

news, framing regards the way of their presentation. The language and the style are the
qualitative characteristics of the news coverage, they matter in the audience's
preferences. Consequently, these are media that decide which issues are most significant
for the public concern and how Ithey are perceived by the audience.
When attributed to my casl�tudies, priming will be observed through the frequency of
the candidates mentioned durii1i.g the period of obse�ation. Framing is relevant to the
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linguistic characteristics-of coverage. The way in which the media set the agenda will
indicate the level of their independence. In this respect it is also important to observe
what particular candidates wer,e featured by the outlets in the beginning and the end of
the campaign.
I would like to suggest an additional and more detailed method to the publications'
analyses. For this purpose I elaborated upon the index of impartiality which concerns the
language of the elections coverage. The index is scaled from 1 to 5, in which 1 indicates
neutral coverage, 2 - neutral to positive; 3 - neutral to negative; 4 - positive; 5 negative. If the newspaper's texts scaled 1 dominated the coverage of the election issues,
this expressed the paper's generally impartial attitude towards the political fi gures. The
dominance of scales 2 and ·3",indicate that the paper is partisan. The frequency of the
' . ...,.

.

scales 4 and 5 demonstrated that the paper was biased.
Two methods- the agenda-setting and the index of impartiality- compliment each
other in terms of providing more subtle analysis of the election coverage. It is easier to
distinguish between the degr_ees of media impartiality in political issues through the
combination of thyse m�thods.

. . DISCUSSION
''·.,, ·

t

Poland
Transformation of the Media Legislation The situation in Polish media changed
radically after the Central Press and Entertainment Board of Inspection ceased its
existence in 1989. This board performed the censorship functions in the media-industry
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before the beginning of the democratic transitions in Poland. Since 1990, the amended
Press Act regulates Polish print papers. The Radio and Television Act of 1992 regulates
the broadcast media. The Press Act has lifted the preventive control of all publications
that was allowed by the previous Statute of 1984. The new law also made possible for the
staffs of the formerly state-owned media to take over their ownership. In order to become
owners, the journalists had to set up a journalists' company. The Press Act also canceled
the system of the state subsidies for press. Due to these changes currently the state owns
only a small segment of media.
According to the law, the only requirement needed to start publishing a new paper is its
registration by the Regional Court. If the court has not decided whether to grant the
registration or not within 30 days from the application date, the newspaper may be
published without such a decision. The registering court may terminate the publication of
the newspaper for one year i� case the outlet committed a criminal offence at least three
times in one year. However,.such cases have never been·reported.
Access to information for the media is guaranteed by the Press Act too. It stipulates
that all state institutions, ec·onomic entities, organizations and other units are obliged to
'I

provide the press with information it needs. The exceptions are the data that contain the
state secret, confidential infomiation, personal privacy and business secrets. In such cases
the institution or person must provide a written explanation of the refusal within a three
day period. However, · the 1'999 Information Protection Act generally classifies as
prohibited for dissemination the data that might damage the state interests, but does not
specify the disclosure of which kind of data may be considered damaging.

' '
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The legislation in Poland protects journalist's right of non-disclosure of his/her
sources of information. Article 180 of the Penal Procedure Code provides such
guarantees. The given ,protectiqn is not extended to the most serious crimes like murder,
high treason, terrorism attack or hostage taking. However, there is no exemption from
criminal liability in case the journalist has been accused of breach of secrecy, particularly
in the case of state secret. In this case the journalist may become the main perpetrator,
especially when the Office of Public Prosecutor cannot identify the leak of secret
information by other means.
Polish media-laws, though adjusted to match W�stem standards, still inherited from the
communist legal system a list of restrictions that violate media freedom. In particular,
Article 10 requires journalist� to perform their professional duties in accordance to the
adopted policy of the outlet Any activity that is contrary to this policy is considered to be
the violation of the journali�t"s obligation under the Labor Code. Though the need for the

'·
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reporter's commitment to his 6utlet is understandable, the rigorous way of putting such
demand in the law makes it incompatible with the democratic practices.
Article 31 provides the right of correction and reply both to individuals and
organizations, including those state-founded, if they consider that the information
'
'

published about them was inaccurate or defamatory. The scope of the right to the
aggrieved party is rather broad, which enables political ,organizations to use the law as an

..

instrument of pressure on the media.
Polish laws make defamation a criminal act. Article 448 of the 1996 Civil Code
obliges the medium to pay conipensation to the aggrieved party in case the outlet offends
the person's good name. This means that the medium is liable even while acting
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diligently but presenting negat�ve comme_nt on the individual's activity. Nevertheless, the
law distinguishes betwee� P,rivate and public person. The public person is not a subject of
compensation in the mentioned case. On the other hand, the criteria of differentiation
,'

between public and pri':'ate person are quite vague. The provision stated in Article 448
replaced Article 40 of the Press Act, which allowed money compensation only in cases
where it was proved that the journalist acted with malicious intent. Since the mentioned
article was established, the journalist's civil responsibility is not a condition to be
exempted from liability.

'·

The legislation gives everi' more legal means to press on media; they have already
come under harsh criticism 'frqtn international observers. According to Article 135 of the
Penal Code anyone who publi'cly assaults the President of Poland is liable to be convicted
for up to three years of impris�nment. Article 226 of the code defines penalty up to two
years of imprisonment for the insult of the constitutional body of the Polish Republic.
.

'

The document does not specify which constitutional body is meant. Article 226 also
makes liable for one-year imprisonment anyone who abases or insults public functionary·.
Article 212 states that anyone who defames by means of mass communication an
individual or a group of individ�als that compose legal entity, is liable for up to two years
of imprisonment. The listed/articles are usually applied to the case of disputes with
. ' ··r'

media. Putting journalist into' jail have become a practice within recent decade; their
imprisonment usually lasts up to several months.
Civil Procedure Code significantly affects the outlets activities through the provision
stated in Article 730. It give� the court a right to issue temporary injunction for not
publishing a newspaper's material in case the claim is credible and the plaintiff can prove

_,;'!,
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that without this me, asur� s/he would be deprived of satisfaction. The proceedings in civil
cases in Poland usually take several months and sometimes years. Thus the realization of
the mentioned mea,sure can �ake a newspaper publication impossible, since the data of
the article may lose their importance after a long time passes.
Polish laws do not state any specific regulations_· on the media activities within
elections. However, they are fa'i- from being defined as supportive of media freedom. The

. .

laws are often in conflict with the principles of the commitment to democracy declared
by the Polish government; the 'legislation has to be harmonized with the demands of the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Poland signed this
document in 199.3. Media-laws are to be put in the line with the relevant laws of
European Union, which Poland has been part since 2004.

The Development

of Civil Society. Historically the external and internal issues

determined the development of civil society in Poland. The former were the
democratization processes in tb.e Central and Eastern Europe, the latter was the role of the
Catholic Church. Church attendance in Poland had being traditionally high which
contributed to making this institution a powerful political force. It was also a unifying
centre for Poles in their struggle for national liberation from Russian Empire within
eighteen's-nineteen's centuries. It had a great authority with people during the communist

'
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period as well. Unlike it was in other countries of the socialist block, in Poland the
church's role in community: iife was not banned by the state. Eventually, citizens'
associations, despite being outlawed, still existed under the communist rule - they took
.. f�',

the forms of the religious 'arid cultural groups that belonged to the church. Catholic
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dioceses were the ,centers of youth, sports', cultural and other organizations. The Catholic
press like 'Jvasz Dziennik (Our.Daily) enjoyed popularity. Church played the crucial role
in supporting opposition S�lidarnosc (Solidarity) movement whose members were the
,,
active participants of the ch��h associations too. The Solidarity's victory within the first
democratic elections in Poland in 1989 was in the great deal explained by the persistence
of civil society groups.
Since then, the Polish non-governmental sector_ developed rapidly. Currently there are
about 51 600 NGOs 1 in Poland. Their areas of interests vary from employment and
community development to · facilitating social service and cultural and educational
programs. The financial aid �of the Western donors as well as funding opportunities
provided by the state increasedI> the accountability demands for Polish NGOs. In 1996, as
Angela Bies (2002) underlih�) the NGOs engaged in a joint initiative to develop a Code
of Ethics. The document, titled as The Charter of Principles for Non-Governmental
Organization Activity was adopted at the September 1996 Forum of Polish NGOs: it
guides the activities of the third sector. The standards, adopted by the charter, are similar
to those of the Western-origin organizations like the US National Charities Information
Bureau (Bies 2002, 5). · '
Some NGOs, 'like Stefan Batory Foundation, Fundacja Wsparcia Miejscowej
Democracji (Foundation in' Support of Local Democracy) .or Stowarzyszenie Ochrony
", 1,";·

Zabytkow Historycznych (The Society of Protection of the Historical Memorials), also
expanded their activities beyond Polish borders, offering training and the scholarship
programs for the young professionals from the former Soviet Union.
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On the other hand, the -�isJed NGOs were rather the exceptions: the third sector in

-.
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Poland faced the typical challenges for NGOs within the transitional period. The major
issues were: lac� of organizational and professional skills; the gap between the NGOs in
rural communities and those located in the developed urban areas; the financial survival.
It turned to be problematic for many NGOs to set clear priorities for their activities. The
urban NGOs had· more. opportunities to access information, professional expertise, and
funding, whereas their small towns' counterparts were isolated from such support.

.

Though NGOs could gain
funds through the number of ways (from the state, the
'
business community, private1��nations, or foreign sources), obtaining funds appeared to
be complicated due to the e�isting legislation. The fiscal incentives for individuals or
businesses are not significant to encourage them to donate money for NGOs.
The notable cHanges in Polish public opinion within last decade had their impact in
the development o'r NGOs too. Since political parties and the Catholic church's ratings
are lower than they were 'in the beginning of democratic transitions in Poland, the NGOs
do not consider desirable to affiliate themselves with both mentioned institutions. The
NGOs demonstrate a strong tendency to maintain autonomy from church and parties.

,..�•-

Another trend is a growing co6peration with the local governments (Regulska 1999, Bies
2002, Kuba Wygnanski, 2004). As Joanna Regulska points out:
NGOs and local governments indeed represent new sets of local institutions
that did not exist ip their current form before 1989. They struggle and yet collaborate
with each other more than with any other public or.private institution. Their
emergence manifests regime change: the devolution of power, democratization of
practices, and greater institutional responsiveness to local needs (1999, 8).
Thus the active citizenry in Poland has passed a significant threshold in establishing
itself. Despite problems of financial stability, civil society groups first developed on the

·+'
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grass-roots level and then as the· actors in the political process. There was a competition
for funds and influence between the NGOs on the local level, but overall the voluntary
sector in Poland demonstrates a capability for being united, which is proved by the
adoption of the Charter of Principles for NGOs Activity. By distinguishing from political
organizations and church, the, NGOs delineated their interests as different from obtaining
power. Through collaboratibn 'with the local governments the third sector organizations
impact the decision-making ''�d in this way contribute to political representation of
citizens. This enables scholars to define Polish civil society as an already institutionalized
phenomenon.
The Freedom House ratip.gs of civil society in Poland support this conclusion.
Between 1997-2006 Poland has a high rating of 1.25 for each of the years which
demonstrates the sustainability of its civil society development. 3

The Economic Performance. Among the post-communist countries Poland was a
pioneer that made a successful' transition from the planned economy to the free market.
Unlike it was in other countries of the socialist block, private ownership for the small
business was not outlawed
in Poland. Between 1989-2000
the Polish economy overcame
.
'
inflation and achieved rapid income growth. Its GDP per capita was estimated at $13,100
in 2005, GDP - real �owth rate was 3.4%.
.

.

The Heritage Foundation's'. 2007 assessment of Poland's economic freedom is 58_.8%,
which makes this country the
world's 8?1h freest economy. However, Poland is ranked
, '
35th' out of 41 countries in the··European region; its overall score is 8.7% lower than the
regional average 67.5 %. By distribution of global economic freedom Poland is defined
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as mostly unfree, since _its rating falls in the category 50-59.9%. However, only 0.2 %
separates Poland from being defined as moderately free economy scaled by 60-69.9%.
The available data ofthe·2006 annual report ofthe Economic Freedom Network "Free
' J�·

the World" scored Polish ecpnomy by 3.9 in 1990,, 6.3 in 2000 and 6.7 in 2004 ' 5.
Poland's scores indicate the sustainable growth of its economy despite high
unemployment and the need offurther liberalization ofeconomy.
Ifrelated to the _media-industry, these data correlate with the evidence ofthe booming
_
media-market in Poland between 1991-2005 when a number ofthe new outlets appeared.
Though not all the newly established media were able to deal with the issues of
transitional economy and cl�'sed down, the majority· has survived. Now they form the
core ofPolish media-market. ·-

,:,-.:·
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The State of the Media-Freedom: the Issue of Accountability. Polish media is
accountable to the State Committee ofRadio and Television and the National Council of
Radio and Televi�ion. Late in 2005 this body was reorganized and the new law was
adopted reducing the number of its members and reappointing an entirely new
committee. The lack ofpublic consultations and the acc'elerated manner ofthese changes
enabled media advocates to speak about the government's desire to take control over the
broadcasting outlets.

On Jhe contrary, the National Council is designed as an

independent body. Since 1997•, when new Constitution was adopted, chairman of the
Council is not appointed by the state but elected among the members of the Council. In
turn, the members are nominated by the Polish parliament. Currently, the Council is
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considered first of all as, an administrative organization that deals with technical issues of
' '.

the broadcasting media.
The Press Circu�ation Audit Union is responsible for the auditing of the press. Other
regulatory functions over the media-industry are mainly performed by the professional
journalism organizations in co.operation with the state_bodies. Polish parliament usually
takes into consideration the drafts of the media laws and the amendments to the
legislative acts proposed by �9-e Polish Journalists' Association or the Chamber of Press
Editors. These, and other journalism organizations, already developed a system of
journalists'. courts to solve th� disputable issues in the media-industry as well as some
cases between the journalists and private persons.
Since 1991 the Polish journalism community 1s guided by the interior code of
professional conduct, or the Media Charter of Ethics. The majority of Polish outlets
established their own charters.' In the beginning of the- democratic transitions in Poland,
many journalists did not consider as mandatory the sets of rules in the Charter. The
situation changed after severa1 significant conflicts between the leading journalists and
the top-officials2 • The media!professionals backed their arguments with the patterns of
the ethic code. This contributed to the perception of the Charter as the powerful
mechanism in the disputable situations, as well as the guidance how to act correctly while
performing professional activities. The new generation of the Polish journalists is more
concerned about ethics. However, the Charter's role should not be exaggerated since the
ethic code is not a universal tool against violation of media freedom. Nevertheless, it is
taken into consideration by both the state and the journalism community within their
relationship.
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The State of the Media.:.Freedom: the Media Criticism Within the 2005 Presidential
Election. The Gazeta Wyborcha had the most frequent coverage of the three presidential
candidates among those twelve that participated in the election. These were Vlodzimierzh
�, ', :-1, !

Cimoshevich, the candidate of the Alliance Democratic Left which was the governing
party before election, Lech Kachynski, the leader of Law and Justice party, and Donald
Tusk, the leader of the Civic Platform party. Other candidates - Henryka Bochniarzh
(the Democratic Party), Yaros,aw Kalinowski (Polish Peasant Party), and Andrzej Lepper
(the Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland party) - were covered less extensively.
Such approach should have make the audience consider them as the minor candidates for
presidency. While Kachynski was mentioned in the paper totally 83 times, Tusk - 79,
Bochniarz was mentioned �ot�Hy 18 times, and Kalinowski - 19. After in September,
Cimoshevich withdrew his candidacy from the race, the paper focused its attention
mainly on two candidates - Kachynski and Tusk - that determined the priming phase
of the agenda-setting in the Gazeta Wyborcha.
Though there is a difference in the way of coverage of both nominees, it is not
significant. Neutral mentioning. about Kachynski counts 39 times, while Tusk was
featured in the neutral context 35 times. Neutral texts dominate the election coverage in
the Gazeta Wyborcha. Thougl;l there is a slight misbalance between neutral to positive
.

'

and neutral to negative cover�ge - 16 versus 18 in case of Kachynski and 13 versus 15
in case of Tusk - the difference in figures is minor. There is the same amount of the
positive and negative mentio.ning about Kachynski - five, however, in case of Tusk
positivism prevails over negativism - ten times versus six.
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Negativism dominated the ·coverage of only one candidate - Lepper, known for his
radical populism and nationalistic position. He was mentioned eight times in neutral to
negative context and �ine times - negatively.
The language of the texts about the candidates was quite critical and mostly based on
'

'

the evaluation judgments. One of the articles about Lepper asked in the subtitle "Is there
anybody in the presidential election who can liberate Poland from Lepper?" The title of
the another publication "The·' President of His Brother" emphasized the role of Lech

.,
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Kachynski's twin brother iri 'the campaign and the his chances to become a pnmeminister of Poland in ca�e the Kachynski won the election.
Nevertheless'. the overall' picture shows that the Gazeta Wyborcha was oriented to
install some kind ·of balance between the two major candidates by distributing more or
less equal amounts of negatively and positively colored data about them. Though the
paper somehow violated the principles of balance presenting more cases of favorable
coverage about Tusk, but in general the Gazeta Wyborcha tended to follow the principles
i

�'

of non-partisanship. The report.s, analytical articles and comments did not dominate over
. � ..
the news coverage. This create�' conditions under which neither Kachynski, nor Tusk was
in the privileged position. C�nsequently, the media audience had an opportunity to
develop their own, opinion about the candidates.
Table 1 illustrates the Gazeta 's Wyborcha the coverage of the presidential candidates
according to the index of impartiality, the figures in the table indicate how many times
the particular way of cov'erage was applied.

.,,
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Table 1. The coverage of the presidential candidates in the Gazeta Wyborcha
Index of lm(!artialitv

'

Candidates

1.
Neutral

2.
3.
Neutral to Neutral
positive
negative

4.
to Positive

5.
Negative

8

7

3

Cimoshevich

19

5

5

0

4

Kachynski

39

16

18

5

5

Kalinowski

7

5

6

0

1

Lepper

11

0

8

0

9

Tusk

35,

13

15

10

6

Bochniarz

'

0

0

Conclusion. The Polish media enjoy high level of independence. The hypothesized
positive impact of the developed civil society in the media freedom was confirmed by my
findings. The outcomes of the research proved the positive influence of the successful
economic performance on the press independence. Because of the dual nature of the
media legislation, it is hard to define the impaqt of laws in the media-freedom. In
particular, among three groups of laws that determine the issues of media-ownership,
access to information, and media-responsibility, each is differently related to the
dependent variable. The legfslation excludes governmental forces from the media
ownership, which has a significant positive influence 6n the media independence. On the
other hand, the severity of punitive actions for journalists is negatively related to the free
press. Such media-laws diminish the watch-dog's role of the press and present a real
threat for the freedom of expression in Poland.

;l:
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The laws that regulate access to information do not have a particular influence on the
media-freedom, apd thus are not related to the press_independence.
The legislation-cannot be seen as the only determinant of the media freedom: despite
the restrictive laws, . the Polish press is mostly free. This is explained by a positive
relationship between civil society and the media freedom, and the positive impact of the
economic performance in the press independence. The development of the citizens'
associations in Poland was nof 'interrupted within the period of the communist rule which
made possible the phenome�on of the underground press. In tum, the underground
publications have · beco�e the basis for the emerging independent media when the
democratic transition in the country began. The existence of the papers that were
alternative to the state outlets: made easier the implementation of the Western-originated
professional standards into Polish media-industry after the change of the regime.
The institutionalized civil_ society in Poland contributed to the growing role of the
journalism NGOs that perform the self-regulative functions of the media-industry and
,

{1'

thus can quell the attempts o'f' state to press on the outlets.
The economic development has positive effect in the media independence too. The
scores of Polish economy demonstrate the tendency of growing which makes the overall
economic environment friendly for forei gn investments into media. This fostered the
press' ability to obtain financial stability as one of the key elements of independence.
Finally, despite the negative effect of legislation, media in Poland can be defined as
mostly free, since the variables of civil society and the economic performance have more
significant positive impact, than the variable of the legislation has.
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Ukraine
Transformation of the Media Legislation. Ukrainian media laws can be characterized

..

as often confusing and lacking definitions of official information and overly discretional

. . •'•

exemptions. Article 34 of the ·constitution of 1996 guarantees the right "to freely collect,
information by oral, written or other means". But the main
store, use and disseminate
_
_
drawback of this law is that it does not include a general right of access to information
held by public authority. This often causes ambiguity while applying media-related
legislation to the disputable cases.
Currently Ukra'.inian outlets function in accordance to the legislation adopted in the
J

beginning and the mid of 1990-s. Aniong those are the laws On Information (1992), On

·,

Print Media (Press) (1992), 'oh Television and Radio (1993), On the State Secret (1994),
On the State Support of the Mass Media and Social Protection of Journalists (1997). The
listed acts, though most of them amended after issued for the first time, do not fully
provide the guarantee for the promulgated rights and freedoms. In particular, Article 49
of the Law on Information obliges the media to compensate moral damage in case when
the outlets' unlawfu! actions inflict material or moral damage on citizens and state
bodies; the amount to be paid as damages is ruled by a court. This allows the individuals
and parties to sue the media fo� defamation on many pretexts and demand huge sums of
compensation. The law-suits; of this sort were frequently used to silence media that
investigated corruption by ruining them financially.' Despite the numerous claims of
journalistic community' to e·stablish certain amount of damages as minimal and/or
maximal, the necessary changes into the law were not made.
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Private ownership of the. media was allowed by the legislation of 1992 and was
expected to change radically the previous relationship between authorities and media.
However, Ukrainian elites did not agree to refuse completely from their control over
outlets. Till today the state o�s 10% of television and radio stations. The state owned
the First National TV reaches 97% of Ukrainian households and has the third largest
reach in the country. In the sphere of the print media the state owned sector is also
significant. As Marta Dychok' points, it counts approximately half of the newspapers and
magazines that appear on the stands since a large number of registered print media do not
actually indicate their owners (2006, 221).
The laws have become th� subjects of reconstruction after the Orange revolution in
2004. However, changes of the laws did not remove all the provisions that limit media
freedom. In partic1:1lar, it was planned to move away from the state to the public form of
ownership. Nevertheless, these changes were never established, and the state-owned
media continue to exist in Ukraine. Those privately-owned are often used as instruments
of their owners' policies dissefuination, since the majority of the mainstream broadcast
and print media belongs to ·ods controlled by the members of Ukrainian parliament and
government.
Nevertheless, some· improvements were done. The Law on Access to Court
Decisions, changed in 2005, permits to access the mentioned documents and obliges
courts to create a register of ali their decisions as well as make them available through the
Internet. The number of amendments to the Civil Code were adopted to remove the
provision prohibiting collecting confidential information and the information that
contains the state secret. On the other hand, the broad scope of Article 182 of the new
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edition of the Criminal Code tan be viewed as threatening freedom of speech in Ukraine.
It classifies all personal data related to individual as "confidential information".
Collections, storage, use and dissemination of confidential information related to the
person without his/her consent is punished of limitation of liberty up to three years.
The 1994 Law On State Secret broadly classifies as harmful for the state's security the
information related to defense and foreign affairs. Changes to the law in 1999 expanded
secrecy to the non-military areas and created three categories of protection of
information: "Specially Important", "Top-Secret" and "Secret". The processing of other
secret information has not been regulated by the laws yet. Moreover, in 1998 the Cabinet
of Ministers adopted the Regulation on the Rules of Accounting, Keeping and Usage of
Documents, Editions and Other Material Carriers Containing Confidential Information
Owned by the State. This regulation contradicts Article 30 of the Law on Information that
defines confidential informati6n as data possessed or used by certain natural persons but
not state. Nevertheless, Article 30 allows dissemination of classified information without
permission of its owner in two cases: if these data are of public interest, and if the right of
public to know prevails over the owner's right for protection of data.
Despite changes of Law on Information in 2003 it still contains controversies and is
quite vague in definitions. In particular, its Article 45 prohibits censorship, but does not
provide enough provisions ort the forms of interference of state or other bodies into the
media policy. Such situation triade possible the existence of unofficial censorship in the
'>

state and privately owned l.Jktainian media within the period of 1998-2004 under the
presidency of Leo°'id Kuchma. The censorship took the form of the so called temnyks, or
the instructions for the news editors on how to cover political events and opposition.
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Temnyks were written at· the ·presidential office and were followed by all national TV', , ,

'>� ..

stations and print media that were controlled by governmental forces.
The Law on Information also provides a .right of accessing the government records. Its
Article 21 sets the methods of making official information public. Article 29 prohibits the
limitation of the right to obtain non-covert information. Nevertheless, Article 37 sets out
a long list of exceptions which make the mentioned Statute dubious and permits state
officials not to grant access to governmental records.
After the 2003 parliam�nt�ry hearings "Society, Mass Media, Authorities: Freedom
, ...

of Expression and Censor�l1iP in Ukraine", some exemptions from liability were
established in the Law on Information. According to the amended Article 47 on
Responsibilities for Breaches· of the Information Law, nobody can be sued for the
expression of value-judgments. The new Article 213 -3 of the Code of Administrative
Offences was an outcome . of the 2003 parliamentary hearings too. It introduced
administrative liability in case the public authority failed to provide information to the
public upon request or released incomplete information.
In 2003 Article 17 of the' Law of Ukraine on State Support of Mass Media and Social
. //

Security of Journalists was amended too. Previous law did not specify the burden of
'f1,

proof in case of infliction of moral damage by a media on a public official or state body.
Since 2003 the plaintiff has to prove that the information is false and that it was
disseminated with 'a malicious intent. However, the ·1aw did not prevent the plaintiff from
bringing obviously unsubstantiated cases. This enabled the practice of the law-suits
against media to' be quite ·regular in Ukraine until 2005. The number of such cases
decreased significantly after thfi Orange revolution.
·l:'.
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Not all of new regulations of media-industry established after the Orange revolution
had positive effect on �edia�freedom. Election Law adopted in 2005 removed its
previous provision that a journalist could comme.nt on a party's program only if it was
paid for by another political p�rty. However, the law did not cancel the limitations on the
• I

media activities. Since 2005 candidates can reply when they believe the media defamed
them. (Before the media were automatically obliged to refute the information in such
cases). Article 66 of the law classifies the information about the candidates' activities
such as meetings, demonstrations etc as political advertisement. This definition affects
the reporters' activities while 'covering elections since any mentioning about the political
event can be treated as advertisement and thus causes problems for the outlet. Article 68
provides even more compli9ations since it bans any journalists' evaluations and
comments on the election ptoc�ess.
·Punitive actions against ukrainian media remain to be the issue of criticism from
international observers. Article 27 of the Law on Press states that the journalists'
accreditation can 'be withdrawn by the bodies that issued it if the journalist neglects
professional obligations. Such definition does not define what is meant by neglecting of
obligations; besides, evoking of accreditation should be the prerogative of professional
journalistic organizations rather than of state or political bodies.
The medium can be closed ·after court decides it breached Articles 3 and 4 of the Law
(•'.

on Press. According to these· articles, advocating war, hate speech or inappropriate
language in the media is an enough reason for termination of its activities. However, the
listed violations should be dealt with through the criminal law and applied to those
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individuals who are responsible for pronouncing hate speech or the like, but not to the
outlet that cited those individuals.
Overall Ukrainian legislation does not create a media-friendly environment.
Unfortunately, 'the rev1s1on of laws after the Orange revolution failed to create the
mechanisms able to prevent violations of press freedom. A number of provisions are to
be removed. The enforcement of some acts that can promote the outlets independence is
lacking. Though Ukraine is a member of Council of Europe and signed European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, this did not change the
�·:J.

situation in which media freeclbm is limited.

Civil Society Development. According to Vira Nanivska, there are about 40,000
·'

NGOs in Ukraine; they tackle a wide range of issues (qtd. in Flounders 2006). Ukrainian
civil society could have undergone a long-term development had it not been for the
period of the Soviet rule'. �s. Svitlana Kuts (2000) points out, the first civic groups in
Ukraine appeared in the end of 19th century when mostly rural communities had formed a
system of reciprocal self supp9rt (Samopomich) that did not require organized structures.

,. ,
I

This system took a niche of so'cial service provision, the latter was poorly performed by
the state. During the Soviet era public participation that was not controlled by the state
was prohibited. Nevertheless, some underground civil society groups already existed in
Ukraine prior to the state's independence. The members of clandestine Ukrainska
Helsinska Spilka (Ukrainian Helsinki Union) worked during Soviet period and were
prosecuted by the authorities.• Some of them later became the founders of the Narodny
Rukh Ukrayiny, the Popular .�ovement of Ukraine that emerged in the mid-l 980s. It was
:
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a powerful mass organization that saw obtaining Ukrainian independence as its main
purpose. The Popular Moveme�t of Ukraine cooperated with other NGOs who shared its
'

'

goal. Among those were Towarystwo Ukrayinskoyi Movy (the Society of Ukrainian
Language), and youthful �oups:

Studentske Bratstvo Mista Lvova (The Student

Brotherhood of the City of L".iv); Ukrainska Studentska Spilka (the Ukrainian Students'
Union). These NGOs had their local organizations in Ukrainian cities, which contributed
to the success of the student hunger strike in October 1990 that demanded the ousting of
the prime-minister-Vitali Masol.
The peaceful obtaining' of Ukrainian independence is also rooted in the wide
popularity of the mentioned NGOs in the countr)' by August 1991. In particular, the
Popular Movement the Society of Ukrainian Language had their brunches not only in big
cities but in the province too i ··soon after the proclamation of the state's independence
numerous organizations began' to appear. Their backgrounds and goals included a diverse
set of social and politic'al issu.es. The key blocks of NGOs were focused on the ideas of
the state's sovereignty, ecological issues and human rights. The rise of NGOs was
fostered by many infemational philanthropist organizations and Ukrainian Diaspora.
These donors that were interested· in the development of democracy and civil society in
Ukraine and provided NGOs with financial aid. Consequently, NGOs embraced different
areas, among those were human rights, independent media, agrarian reforms, health care,
democratic development, a�d' education. The target groups of NGOs included children

,; '

and young people, ethnic min:otities, and poor or otheIWise disadvantaged citizens. Some
of the voluntary organizations have become the co-founders of the first independent print
outlets in Ukraine. Like it was in case of Lviv Shevchenko's Society that founded the
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weH-known paper Post-Postup (The Post-Advancement) together with the journalistic
staff.
Between 1992-1997 NGOs developed individually throughout all regions of Ukraine.
A number of the earliest formed organizations ceased their existence, some became
political parties, as it happened with Popular Movement of Ukraine. Closer to the end of
1990s, NGOs started facing the problem of sustainability. According to Kuts, this
happened due to the lack of �esources, underdeveloped fundraisings skills, and the legal
framework that regulated the, NGOs activity (2000, 4). The laws that determine the
financial background of the NGOs contain many provisions and demand a number of
procedures to obtain funding'. In particular, corporations and other businesses do not
benefit from donating �oney for NGOs. The state funding was based on the grants
competitions but the grants barely covered the basic needs of the nongovernmental
sector. The process of competition was not transparent. Those organizations that were
located far from the capital usually had small chances to obtain money.
The impact of the NGOs in society was getting lower also due to the governmental
campaign against them: th� �t!}te officials tried fo represent these organizations as the
"Western agents" whose ·id.;blogy may be hostile towards Ukrainian people. The
economic crisis in Ukraine between 1996-2000 also contributed to the poor image of
NGOs in public opinion since the majority of voluntary organizations could not provide
the social servic'es for the large numb'er of those who needed them.
Nevertheless, the explosion of the Orange revolution in 2004 made scholars argue
about the vibrant civil 'society .in Ukraine (Kuzio 2005, Aslund 2005). Though before
2004 the civic engagement of Ukrainian people was perceived as rather low. When the
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,

.1"1.
. ;

50
authorities large-scale fraud of the results of 2004 presidential election made the
governmental candidate Victor Y anukovytch president, this caused the unprecedented
outpouring of voting masses in the streets all over the country. The mass demonstrations
led the Supreme Court to n�llilY the results of the second round of voting and to call for a
repeat runoff. The opposition -'candidate Victor Yuschenko was elected a leader of the
state.
The success of the Orange revolution can in part be explained by the extensive
grassroots campaign that was expanding within several years before the mentioned
democratic breakthrough. In previous years there were well-organized anti-governmental
demonstrations too but they never attracted sufficiently large masses to pose a threat to
the regime. Nevertheless, these protests significantly contributed to the evolvement of the
new generation ofNGOs. Thv-,Youthful organizations Pora (It's Time), Razom (Together)
''
and Znayu (I Know) played a crucial role in the Orange revolution. Young people, the
members -of these NGOs, have acquired a Western mindset through the influence of the
modem ways of communication like the Internet and satellite TV; many of them studied
or worked in Western Europe and North America. The leaders of the mentioned NGOs
received training from Serbian youthful movement Otpor (Protest) and its Georgian
counterpart Khmara (Don't Be Scared). Despite having grown up under the semi
authoritarian Kuchma's regime, the new Ukrainian generation took the desirability of
democracy as given. They s�pported the opposition candidate Yuschenko's vision of
European model of Ukraine. Thus far, the 2004 success of the civil society in Ukraine
could be attrib11,ted to both grassroots campa1gnmg and a coalition formed by the
opposition and civil society groups.

51
However, these groups diqi jlot prevent Ukrainian backslide from democracy since the
revolution. There are several reasons: The leaders of politically oriented NGOs like It's
Time and Together became the lower level parts of the new government, and failed to
perform their new. duties due to the lack of experience. There is no unity between civil
society groups iri Ukraine, they do not form coalitions or blocks. The citizens'
disappointment in the new authorities' policy extrapolated to the NGOs too since the
latter supported the government when it was the opposition. Consequently, the civic
activism in Ukraine is more the issue of spontaneity than deep penetration of civic culture
traditions into the society. cMently it can not be viewed as the solid background for the
stable democratic development.
The Freedom· House rated Ukrainian civil society by 2.75 in 2006. This rating
improved since '1997 when Ukraine scored 4.00 and 3.75 in 2004. However, the rating is
still far from the result that indicates significant democratic progress in the country.
.
.
The Economic Performance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union Ukraine has

experienced economic decl,ne'-in the mid- l 990s, but since then has improved gradually
. . ,;,/
between 2000-2003. After tl'ie Orange revolution in 2004 new Ukrainian government
promised reforms of economy and market openness but they were not implemented. The
government failed to address 'the issues of high inflation rates and corruption among the
•'

most urgent. Government expenditures equal nearly two-fifths of GDP which was $7000
in 2005, GDP-real growth.i-ate was 2.6%.
Current Ukraine's economy is 53.3% free (the Heritage Foundation's assessment),
which makes it the 125th frees't in the world. Ukraine is ranked 40th out of 41 countries in
,,
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the European regi9n. Its overall score is much lower - by 14.2% - than average of the
region. Ukraine falls into the category of mostly unfree by distribution of Global
Economic Freedom.
Level of economic freedom m Ukraine was 5.4 in 2004, as estimated by the
Economic Freedom Network."Free the World." This level was scored 3.4 in 1995 and 5.3
,.

in 2002. These ratings reflect the extension of Ukrainian media-market between 19952002 which, in turn, was redistributed between the oligarchy that merged with the state
structures by the end of 2003.

The State of the Media-Freedom: the Issue of Accountability. In Ukraine the media
is accountable to the list of the state bodies. Among those are the State Committee of
Communication and Information, the State Committee of Information Policy and
Broadcasting, National Counci1 for Radio and Television, the Parliament Committee on
the Issues of

Press Freedom and Information, and the Department of Special

Telecommunication Systems 'and Defense of Information, which is the branch of the
Security Service of Ukraine, formerly known as KGB. Though the declared tasks of each
of these organizations differ, they often overlap which imposes more state control over
the media. For instance; State Committee of Information Policy and Broadcasting deals
with ethical issues in the med�a, it is also responsible for broadcasting inspection and the
state's conception of the infortnation policy. Meanwhile, National Council for Radio and

,,. '

Television controls broadcastirtg issues too, this body makes the state policy in licensing.
The State Committee of Communication and Information regulates broadcasting through
the technical issues, like TV and radio frequencies waves, and ensures availability of the
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Internet in the country. The !)epartment of Special Telecommunication Systems and
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Defense of Information does' monitoring of the Ukrainian on-line sources and is also
responsible for the state's information policy.
The independent journalists' organizations that appeared within recent years do not
play a significant role in regulating media issues. They are few and most of media
professionals in Ukraine are not aware about the existence of the structures like the
Independent Journalists' Trade-Union or the Commission on Journalism Ethics. Between
2001-2006 the journalists' NGOs made several attempts to diminish the state's role in
media-industry through si@.ing
' petitions to the president and government and arranging

,,

national round-table talks to·gether with statesmen. These activities purported making
changes into media-related legislation, but the discussions did not result in adopting the
necessary legal ac_ ts. The journalism organizations established the Ethic Code of the
Ukrainian Journalists in 2003. However, this document has rather nominal than real
power of guide for the prqfessional activities. Most of the journalists do not consider
mandatory to follow media ethics in their every day practice, which is reflected m
partisanship coverage that doqiinates the large part of the Ukrainian press.
The State of the Media-Fteedom: the Media Criticism Within the 2004 Presidential
.' ·,

Election. Among the seventeen candidates that participated in Ukrainian presidential
elections of 2004 there �ere two leaders of the campaign - the former prime-minister
Victor Yuschenko. and the prime-minister in power Victor Yanukovytch. They were
affiliated with the· antagonistic political forces. Yuschenko was a leader of the anti
presidential opposition, Yanukovytch was backed by the president in force Leonid
Kuchma. Other candidates were: the leader of the Green Party Vitaliy Kononov, the
I

,
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leader of Ukrainian Socialist Party Olexander Moroz, and the leader of Ukrainian
,,

Communist Party Petro Sym,onenko.
All the mentioned canqidates have received the diverse coverage in the newspaper

Den. Priming in the Den's agenda-setting was determined by the clearly unequal
distribution of the data amounts between the candidates. Within the observed period
Yuschenk:o was mentioned i�·-'the newspaper Den 44 times, Yanukovytch - 48 times,
Kononov - once, Symonenk:o - seven times,. Moroz - once. By mentioning
Kononov, Symonenko and Moroz a few times, the paper send the message to the
audience about 'the marginal impact of the se candidates in the elections. Consequently,
the outlet's audience was expected to perceive particularly Yanukovytch and Yuschenko
as the leaders of the campaign, since their names were pronounced in the paper most
frequently.
'r.·

Yuschenko's name was mentioned 16 times in the neutral context. Neutral to negative
1}.'.

coverage of Yuschenk:o domiriated over neutral to positive (nine times against five). On
the contrary, in case ofYanukovytch neutral to positive coverage was more frequent than
neutral to negative (twelve times versus five). Three times opposition nominee was
featured positively1 ten times - negatively. The neutral mentioning about Yanukovytch
counted 18 times. Thirteen times Yanukovytch was featured in the positive context.
There were no negative· ·publications about him within the period of observation. The
frequency of use of negative and positive tone in relation to both candidates, as well as
·r

the difference between the

u&,e' of neutral to positive and neutral to negative context are
,.

significant. It shows that the D�n created unequal opportunities for the representatives of
the rival parties.
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The escalated negativism_ towards Yuschenko and partisanship in respect to
Yanukovytch determined the. next stage of the agenda-setting in the Den - the framing.
Negative coverage targeted to" diminish Yuschenko as a presidential candidate and to
discourage voting for him. Positive ways of featuring Yanukovytch should have make
voters support him during election.
The evaluation judgments were frequent in the language of the Den 's texts. In
particular, while ·featuring the case of poisoning Yuschenko during the race, the paper
characterized his vision of the problem as "the political technology" and "the cynical
situation".

. '
Openly supporting the gov�hlmental candidate and being one-sidedly negative towards

opposition nominee, the Den violated the principles of the balanced coverage and
demonstrated biased approach while featuring elections. The paper was also overloaded
with extended articles containing analyses and forecasts of the possible election outcomes
while news were covered less. This contributed to the misbalance in the general coverage
of the campaign, as well as the coverage of particular candidates.
Table 2 illustrates the Den· 's coverage of the presidential candidates according to the
index of impartiality, the figures in the table indicate how many times the particular way
of coverage was applied.
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Table 2. The coverage of the presidential coverage in the newspaper Den
Index of lmJ!artialitv

Candidates
Kononov

1

Moroz

1

Symonenko
Yuschenko
Yanukovytch

2.
Neutral
positive

1.
Neutral

3.
4.
to Neutral to Positive
negative

5.
Negative

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

3

0

0

0

4

16

5

9

3

10

12

5

13

,

' 1�

0

Conclusion. The-Ukrainian media can be defined as _partially free. My hypothesis has
been confirmed in case of Ukraine to some extend. The relationship between media
freedom and civil society �s positive, however, since its traditions in Ukraine are not
'1'
persistent, this relationship : is not significant. Ukraine's overall poor economic
performance has a negative effect in the media freedom too.
The impact of the legislation is ambiguous: the laws that define the issues of
ownership, access·to information, and the media responsibility are differently related to
the media independence. Though the Ukrainian laws allow the private ownership on the
media, this did not produce the expected results of a more free press. The state still
remains to be the powerful actor in the media-industry since the members of the
government and political lead¢.rs own the large part of media in Ukraine. As a rule, these
I.

media are viewed as the ins�ents for the achievement of their owners' . political
interests. The Ukrainian laws do not provide the legal framework for the journalists of
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state papers to become the owp.ers of their outlets. The absence of such provision makes
these media the appendages ,'pf the official policy. Eventually, the laws that regulate
media-ownership are negative�y related to the media-freedom.
The legislation also affects media freedom through the issues of access to information.
The existing controversies and ambiguity in definitions create restricted areas for the
journalists' inquiry and limit media's natural desire to inform and to explain the issues.
Particularly, the restrictions on the outlets' comments within elections contradict the
basic principles of the democratic society, and the public's right to know is limited by the
legislative acts too. The laws about access to information negatively impact the media
freedom.
The laws that define med1� responsibility overall can have a negative influence on
the press freedom. However, .this influence is not significant since the practice of the
recent years demonstrates the decrease of the number of punitive actions against
journalists. Thus far, this group of laws is not reiated to the current state of freedom of
the Ukrainian media.
The legislation alone cannot explain the partial freedom of the press. On the contrary,
the interaction between media-laws and the economic performance throw the light on the
�

�I

mentioned issue. Since the cohntry's GDP per capita is low and its economy is scaled as
,

,,,

mostly unfree, under these conditions the papers can hardly achieve financial stability or
make profits without the external funding. The economic situation in Ukraine makes the
media to fall into the hands of private owners, most of them are the key political and
economic players. 'Thus the e�onomic performance has a significant negative impact in
the press freedom through its interaction with the laws that regulate the media-ownership.
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Though Ukrainian civil society proved its vibrancy during the Orange revolution, it is
not powerful enough yet to f9ster the press independence. The self-organization of the
citizens is rather �n issue of spontaneity, its traditions need deeper penetration into public
consciousness to become persistent.

The institution of NGOs is relatively new in

Ukraine. Among the existing,· NGOs those referred particularly to journalism issues
compose a narrow segment. !hese and other independent organizations do not have a
serious influence on the process of decision-making and cannot be responsible for the
political representation of the citizens. The civil society's development in Ukraine does
not have serious influence on the media-freedom.
Finally, the partial independence of the Ukrainian press is explained by the negative
impact of the economic performance and the relationship of the press freedom with the
variable of civil society which is positive but insignificant.

. '-

Russia

Transformation of the M�dia Legislation. Russian media legislation has . passed
through the series bf changes since 1991 when the first Press Law was established until
current. The mentioned law proclaimed the press freedom for the first time in Russia. It
was influenced by Anglo-Arti�rican watch-dog philosophy and created a status for free
media. However, ;new legislation did not prevent the press and TV from becoming the
subject of mixed state-market ·regulations. In turn, the'y enabled the states' interference
into the media-industry and the survival of old regulatory model in which the state
,

�,'

agencies are major media-po�icy makers. Changes to media-related laws made these
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phenomena to be persistent. 'In particular, media are the most affected through the issues
of ownership and accountabllity.
The Law of the Russian Federation On Mass Media, adopted in 2003, regulates the
current media-industry in Russia. Now government plays greater role in running media
affairs, this concerns both economic and political issues. The government preoccupies in
drafting amendments to the media law as well as rules for registering Internet
publications and stations that broadcast via computer.
The current Law On Mass Media is controversial; some definitions in the statute are
quite vague. Article 7 of :the law allows private ownership of the media and bans

.

ownership by foreign citizensh-Iowever, foreign companies can own the media in Russia.
.

The article 18 states that founders of the media outlet cannot interfere into editorial
policy. An exception is made when the founder and the editorial staff sign an agreement
that allows such interference., The current founders of Russian print media usually are
their major sponsors. This makes unavoidable their interference into the media activities,
since the outlet is financially_ dependent on the founder. In the number of cases the
founder, the chief editor and the main shareholder is the same person. Within recent years
it has become the regular p'r��tice when the state bodies are founders or co-founders of
. 1;

the media and thus actively c6n'travene into their activities.
Between 1995-2005 the· Federal Statute on the Economic Support of District
(Municipal) Newspapers encouraged the state ownership of the papers. State-owned
outlets were included in the Federal Register and received donations from governmental
budget. The state· bodies provided subsidies to the print outlets published by the self-

_r,
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government bodies on the condition that the papers presented business plan supported by
the federal budget.-·
Certain legal acts stress the government's principal role in forming informational
policy. The Federal Statute· on Information, lnformatization, and Protection of
Information, drafted at the office of Russian president, points on the governmental right
on information. The Federai Statute on Participation in International Exchange of
Information lists the responsibilities of the government to provide the subjects of
Federation ·with information from abroad, to update and protect information resources,
and to introduce modem informational technologies. The statute gives the governmental
institutions specifi'c rights to' control different aspects of informational exchange under
the overall supervision of the Committee on lnformatization Policy which is part of the
presidential office.·
The 1994 Federal Statute 'oh the Coverage of the activities of the State Agencies in
the State Media made mand�f�ry for the state outlets to publish and broadcast appeals
and statements made by the president, the Council of Russian Federation, the State
Duma and the government. The law also obliged the state media to broadcast and cover
openings of the first official sessions of the parliament as well as inauguration of the
president. The state media inust publish the official reports as well as other materials of
the state agencies· that are the �ounders of these media.
They are also obliged to allocate space for election propaganda materials presented by
'

.

candidates, electoral associations and blocs. The papers must publish these materials free
'

. 'I

of charge, as Article 39 of the'\ 999 Law On Basic Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the
Right of Citizens to Participate in Referendum states. In practice this means that the

61
. . .

mentioned outlets have to:· d�y on propaganda for governmental candidates, but not
' "

·I .

opposition parties, since the state agencies are the founders of these media. Thus the state
papers are excluded from facilitating political pluralism.
Other decrees that affect mass media have been put in force within the last decade.
.

'

Since January 1997 the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation introduces criminal
liability for slander. The latter is defined as dissemination of false information which
defames other persons. Such definition creates ambiguity regarding the information that
can or cannot be perceived_ as false. This, in turn, provides the legal possibilities for
making political pressure ori the media outlets. Article 146 of the Criminal Code,
amended in December 2003, ·establishes the penalty up to 500 000 rubles (approximately
17 240 USD) and a deprivation of freedom up to five years for those accused m
substantial damages as a consequence of an abuse of copyright as well as plagiarism.
In January 2004 the new Statute on Communication gave the state organs the
authority to regulate the services of communication by determining the rights and
obligations of those participating in such activities. The statute regulates procedures for
broadcasting stations to get a license to transmit their signals, but is often used as a test of
'),

the loyalty for broadcasting rtiedia.
Only those whose media policy is not contrary to the
1.
;'

governmental are granted the 'ficense. Nevertheless, the license can be cancelled by the
authorities if it was' received by fraud or violates the terms of the existing law. In addition
other reasons for· the license cancellation

can be provided by the laws of Russian

Federation, as Article 32 .of the media law states. However, these reasons are not
identified, which complicates the everyday functioning of the broadcast medium.

;.. i... ,
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The activities of the medium may be terminated· according to Article 16 of the media
law. The Article states that the suit filed by the registration body for the need for security
can serve as a ground for the suspension.
The legal documents regulating media, particularly some articles of the Civil Code
and the Statute on State Secrets, create problems for the
press and broadcast outlets in
.
�-

obtaining and disseminating information. Article 151 of the Civil Code adopted in 1995
lays the responsibility only for the journalist or editor of the media for the correctness of
information but not on the source of information. This often makes difficult for the media
to prove the accuracy of the data and can be viewed as an impediment for the
investigative reporting in R�ssia. · Article 51 of the media law prohibits journalists to
collect information for outside person or organization. This wide formulation makes
illegal for the journalist even sharing some professionally related information within
his/her informal communication.
The Statute on State Secret:s adopted in July 1993 relates to a state secret information
from the area of defense, for�ign policy, economy, intelligence, counter-intelligence and
the activity of operational-criminal investigations. �he dissemination of the information
that can be perceived as damaging the security of Russian Federation may cause penalties
for the media. Among the information prohibited for disclosure are those relevant to the
production and storage of the ·nuclear weapons; the plans of the state to break a military
action; the achievements of. science and technology that are significant for the state's
;_

economy and security. Though public has a right to know about the production and
storage of the nuclear weapons and plans to break a military action. The notion
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"achievements of science and technology" is far too broad; it is not specified in the law
,�'
which disclosures of achieverri:ents are damaging the state's security.
The formal justification for the 2001 amendment to the Article 4 of the media law
was combating terrorism. Provisions prohibiting conducting a criminal offence, divulging
secrets, conducting extremist activities, disseminating information about weapons
technology and propagating pornography were set out in a media-specific law though it
would be more logical to include them into the laws of general application. Provision on
"conducting extremist activities" is quite vague and does not specify what is meant by the
mentioned activities. The amendment of 2001 to the law on terrorism lists provisions
A(, ;

prohibiting the disseminatiorf- through media: the technical information used during
counter-terrorism operations; the information that hinders the conduct of the mentioned
operations and its participants; the information which dissemination threatens the life and
health of individuals ·who are located in and beyond the zone of counter-operation.
However, these provisions· are focused mainly on the wrong actors since this is a
responsibility of authorities, not of media, to preven� the dissemination of the secret
information. Besides, the listed categories of information can not be legitimately secret
in all cases since they can alsQ:be necessary in the interest of public.
,f,

In addition, the media sph�re is regulated by other documents, like the Doctrine of
Informational Security signed.'by president Putin in September 2003. This document has
no legal power but expresses Kremlin's policy in the media sphere. According to the
doctrine, Russian citizens face'a number of threats from the media, among those are "the
misuse of information" and "the propaganda of mass culture based on the cult of
violence" (2003, 2). The doctrine expresses concerns about "growing dependence of the
,.-',
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spiritual, political and economic life of the country on foreign information structures"
(2003, 8).
Overall, Russian media 'legislation contains too many limitations for the media
activities. It formalizes the connections of media with governmental structures and makes
the everyday practice of the print and broadcast outlets incompatible with the basic
demands of the democratic society. The media law has a chilling effect on freedom of
expression and establishes the status of media as the counterparts of the particular regime
of restrictions.
Russia has not 'signed a European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.

The Civil Society Developinent. Different sources present the diverse data about the
number of NGOs in Russia:;'while the Russian Duma (parliament) counts 450 000 of
NGOs, the Yale Center for the· Study of Globalization suggests the higher number of
600 000.
Russian civil society groups appeared almost spontaneously in the beginning of the
1990s and were obliged by their emergence to the processes of glasnost (openness) and
perestroyka (reconstruction) initiated by the president Mikhail_ Gorbachev. Though the
dissidents' movement in Russia existed prior to the democratic transitions, it was merely
represented by individuals' and rarely took the form of well-organized groups.
Nevertheless, the politically ·�nented NGOs, like The Memorial, have become famous
quickly for disclosing previously restricted materials about Stalinist repressions in the
USSR. The NGO Miloserdiye (Mercy) gained the widely acknowledged popularity for its
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charitable activities. Now· the non-profit sector in Russia includes social service

,,

f \·,

providers, policy think-tanks;<health care and educational organizations, human rights
groups, and gender-based groups.
The civil groups in Russia were debilitated by both the absence of financial stability
and lack of knowledge on ho.w to act as the voluntary organizations. Many members of
these groups tried to implement the practices of Soviet-era mass organizations in NGOs,
which was not compatible with the new reality. Such intentions often discouraged the
Russian public from joining NGOs, since the experience of the Soviet-style "compulsory
,

_.,
,,

voluntarism" in the state-domip.ated organizations was well-remembered. The survival of

,,

NGOs during the economic crisis that followed the collapse of the USSR was the most
serious issue. Many salaried employees of NGOs often worked without payment; a
number of NGQs ceased their existence. Under these conditions, the financial aid from
the Western partners appearect'" to have become a rescue for Russian civic groups. Funding
from foreign agencies started to arrive to Russia in the early 1990s. According to Sarah
Henderson, the United Agency
· for International Development (USAID) distributed $92
million to Russian dvic groups between 1992-1998 (2002, 141).
�

f

'•

However, financial aid cobld not overcome the burden of totalitarian past in Russian
'I

history where the democratic 'traditions were absent. Civil society was particularly new
phenomenon, and without prior history, mutual trust as part of political culture was
absent. Fostering trust has been the major chalienge in post-Soviet Russia. In this climate
it was hard to exp�ct from the NGOs creating networks among themselves and become
institutionalized. The· intentions of Western organizations to develop civil society in
Russia by providing support for NGOs did not have the expected results. As Henderson
' .
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stresses, the NGOs rarely reflected the interests of people they represented, but rather the
concerns of their external donors (2002, 152). In other words, the priorities in the NGOs
activities targeted to match the agendas of the foreign assistance programs but not the
domestic needs.
,j

The gap between Russia'.ri · urban areas and small towns hindered the existence of
provincial NGOs. Foreign aid was merely distributed in the big cities and reached the
rural communities only occasionally. Such gap, instead of cooperation, developed
competitive behavior among NGOs. Consequently, they failed to involve Russian public
into the process of shaping 'political discourse and soon became excluded from this
discourse by a more powerful actor - state. The separation between NGOs and citizens
made easier for the authorities to marginalize ihe opinion about the voluntary
organizations often defined as'"grants eaters" by people in power. Within the last decade
<\.

,,
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NGOs · have been denounced, by Russian strongmen as illegitimate meddling into
domestic politics. In particular� the Western-based NGOs have been harassed.
Russian government is persistent in ousting the voluntary sector. In 2006 the Civic
;

.

Chamber of the Russian Federation was created under the patronage of president
Vladimir Putin. Its formal purpose is to submit recommendations to the Duma about
socially important legislation. In addition, executive authorities create their own NGOs
and foundations that will provide grants. The independent NGOs face another threat to
'f

be replaced by the govern.m�ntal system of the organizations loyal to the state. The
tightened state control ov�r 'NGOs leads to the diffusion of voluntary groups and
.

'

eliminates civil society 6n the institutional level.
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The recent changes to the legislation that regulates NGOs activity poses a number of
,J.

.,

threats on the third sector too. In January 2006 the president Putin signed into law a new
bill that requires_. from all local and foreign NGOs to inform the government in advance
about all the projects they are going to conduct. The law also requires foreign-based
groups and those receiving funding from abroad to register with the government. The
already existing NGOs have had to re-register as exclusively Russian organizations.
Foreign citizens that are not permanent residents of Russia are not permitted to become
founders of NGOs.
Eventually, Russian NGOs as transitional actors failed to become promoters of
democracy in their country. The absence of homogeneity in the density of civic
associations in the big cities and rural areas is typical for the post-totalitarian countries.
But in Russia this· gap· appeared to have more dramatic consequences for the civil society
since it affected its development on the grassroots' level. Thus the necessary link between
civil society and political participation, as one of the dimensions of democracy, was not
established (Natalia Letki 2004, 667). Civic groups were not capable to provide the
public with political representation and establish civil society as an institution. Its
.,

I ..

weakness exposed Russian deri1ocracy to the authoritarian practices of the old regime.
The Freedom House ratings of civil society in Russia were 3.75 in 1997, 4.00 in
2002, 4.75 in 2005 and 5.00 in 2006. These indicators demonstrate the growing
vulnerability of civic groups;' in Russia as well as the country's backslide from the
democratic path of development.
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The Economic Performance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian
economy has gone through the turbulence of the financial crisis in 1995 to the growing
'

'

stabilization between 1999-2007. Russian GDP per capita was $11,000 in 2005, while
GDP - real growth rate was assessed by 6.4%.
,t.

According to the Heritage Foundations' data, in 2007 Russian economy is 54% free,
!r

it is the 120th freest economy in the world. Russia's rank in Europe is 39th out of 41
countries, its overall score is significantly lower - by 13.5% - than the regional
average 67.5%. By distribution of global economic freedom, Russia is recognized as
mostly unfree. The Russian· economy, though demonstrating progress, has been affected
by several debilitating issues. The economy continues to be heavily dependent on sales of
natural resources, corruption weakens rule oflaw.
Russian level of economic' freedom was estimated at 5.6 in 2004 by the Economic
,,I·,.

Freedom Network "Free the W,orld". In 1995 this rating was 4.0, while in 2001 it was 4.9
and 5.2 in 2003. Such growth in scores also reflects the rapid development ofthe Russian
media-market between 1995-2005. Current stabilization of the media-market marks the
final stage ofthe proce·ss ofredistribution ofproperty in the country, where the outlets are
the appendages ofpolitical and financial players.

The State of Media Freedom: the Issue of Accountability. The Russian print and
.,

electronic media-outlets are··.accountable to the Ministry of Press, Broadcasting and
,·

(',\1,

Means of Mass Communications. The chair of the ministry is appointed by and
accountable

to

the

president

of Russia.

In

addition,

the

Vsierossiyskaya

Gosudarstvennaya Tele-Radio-Companiya (VGTRK, the All-Russia State Television and
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Radio Company) controls the regional TV-stations. The state also has the means of
unofficial control of the medi�, among those are the tax audits, police confiscations and
sanitary tests. Tl\ey are often used as the way of pressure on the outlets.
The journalism. organizations in Russia can not be viewed as capable to create the

.

system of self-regulation in the media-industry. There is a division among the Russian
journalism NGOs: the organizations like National Association of Television and Radio
Broadcasters or the Academy_of the Russian Television were created by the state; others,
like the Union of Russian _Jou_ rnalists (URI) or the Russian Fund of the Protection of
Open Information appeared-- �s a result of the journalists' initiatives. The Union of
1

,. ,.'i

Russian Journalists carries out numerous activities in support of the press freedom
development in the country. Nevertheless, they did not result in producing significant
changes in the atmosphere of the journalism commimity. In particular, Union of Russian
Journalists as the largest body of the media-professionals in the country, established the
Code of Professional Ethics in 1994. The local Councils of Ethics were established too.
An extraordinary 1995 Congre�s of the URI adopted a resolution devoted to the cases of
violation of ethical principl,es· 'by some Russian media. However, both documents were
• •i,.'.

not perceived by the majority, ?f the media-professionals as those obliging them to act in
accordance. Such pheno�ena. as publishing the hidden advertisement or gaining money
from various st�ctures · for publishing articles in their favor remain to be the common
practice. Introducing the norms of ethic code into life is problematic since it needs
induces not only on the level of journalists but on the societal level as well. Following
professional ethics is not an issue of concern for the journalists, and the attempts to create
the self-regulation mechanisrnis have poor chances to succeed in Russia.

'•
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The State of Media Freedom: the Media Criticism Within the 2005 Presidential
Election. Among six presidential candidates the president in force Vladimir Putin was a
favorite of the coverage in the Izvestiya: he was mentioned 38 times totally within a

'·

period of observation, among those 14 times in the neutral context. There was a
significant difference between the quantity of neutral to positive and neutral to negative
coverage of Puti:i;i- eight versus one- , and even larger between positive and negative
- 15 versus zero.
Other candidates were covered with less intensity and less favorably. Irina
Khakamada who represe�ted the opposition Union of the Right Forces was covered in the
neutral to negative and negative contexts the most frequently- six and five
times. The opposition candidate was never mentioned in the neutral to positive or positive
tone, the amount of times of neutral mentioning was not significant- 3 times.
Another group of candidates - Oleg Malyshkin, (the Liberal-Democratic Party of
Russia), Nikolay Charitonov, (the Communist Party), Ivan Rybkin (the leader of the
Socialist Party), and Sergey Glazyev (the leader of the rightist party Fatherland) - were
mentioned a few times each.
Consequently, within the priming stage of the agenda setting the Izvestiya targeted to
emphasize the importance of the only one candidate- Putin- for the expense of other
,',

nominees for presidency. In r case of the Izvestiya the difference between priming and

·,:1,

framing is little, since the paper initially devoted the larger part of specifically favorable
coverage to the incumbent pr�sident and did not consider other candidates to be equal
participants of race. There is a large gap between the amount of data about Putin and each

.,
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of the other candidates. For instance, the total coverage of Kharitonov is three times
which definitely contrasts the number of mentioning about Putin - 38.
The evaluation judgments dominated the newspaper's articles. For instance, in one of
the texts Khakamada was called "our Orleans virgin... that yesterday collected her credits
on the loyalty to Putin while today she collects them on the hatred towards him."
Another text characterized as "farce" the events connected with the disappearance of
Rybkin.

-,·
The lzvestiya 's coverage put its audience into the situation where the choice among

candidates was excluded. The dominance of opinion writings and the interviews loaded
with supportive comments to the leader of the state created the dissonance with the news
that were reported·in small�r :�ount. Clearly partisan coverage in the lzvestiya violated
the basic standards of media objectivity and created sharply different opportunities for the
candidates. Polarization of th� ·election coverage eliminated any alternative to Putin, and
the readers of the lzvestiya were
' expected to prefer particularly this candidate during
voting.
Table 3 illustrates the lzvestiya 's the coverage of the presidential candidates
.

'

according to the index of impartiality, the figures in the table indicate how many times
the particular way'of coverage was applied.
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Table 3. The coverage of the presidential candidates in the newspaper Izvestiya
Index of lml!artialitv

Candidates

1.
Neutral

3.
2.
Neutral to Neutral
negative
positive

4.
to Positive

5.
Negative

. (

Glazyev

5

0

2

0

2

Kharitonov

0

0

2

0

1

Khakamada

3

0

6

0

5

Malyshkin

3

1

0

0

0

Putin

14.

8

1

15

0

Rybkin

2.

1

7

0

4

.
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Conclusion. The Russian 1 press is not free. My findings confirmed the negative
relationship between the media independence and the legislation; the economic
performance and civil society in Russia are not related to media freedom.
All three groups ·of laws that determine the issue of ownership, access to information,
and the media responsibility negatively impact the dependent variable. Russian legal acts
require little transparency in_ media-ownership and support the state's officials as the
major shareholders of the outl�ts. This makes the state responsible for the editorial policy
of the particular papers and· remains to be superior in articulating general media policies.
Under such conditions the censorship is hardly avoidable and the diversity of viewpoints
is often substituted by a �ingle opinion.
The legislatiop that determines access to information is mainly restrictive and
confines both the performance of journalists' professional duties and the audience's right

11•.;fl,
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to know. Many areas are closed to the media devaluing their role as the vehicles of public
control over the authorities.
The laws exclude the actors other than state from the process of regulation of media
industry. Eventually, the legislation decreases the number of independent voices in media
and encourages the state's penetration into all levels of industry.
Overall, civil society has a positive impact in the media-freedom but in case of Russia
these two variables are not related. This happens due to the weakness of the Russian
.. ,:·"I:

voluntary sector and the absen,ce of the civil society traditions. The government has been
ousting the civic groups, from public domain by both legal and economic levers, and the
NGOs are not capable to oppose the political pressures on themselves and the media.
The state of Russian economy does not have an explanatory power in the media
freedom. The economic performance demonstrates a tendency to progress within recent
years but this cann.ot influence the free press development since the media-market is
already shared between the major political and economic players.
Consequently, there are smalt
chances for the free press in Russia without a change of
' .: · � '
political regime that should n'ave reform media-laws and create supportive environment
for the civic groups' development.

CONCLUSION

Doris Graber's statement' that "nowhere is the media totally free from formal and
.i''
informal government and social controls" (1997, 19) is particularly reflective for the
, I

I
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media-reality of the developing democracies. Where democratic rules of the game are
already established, like in P<?Jand, this does not mean that Polish papers have become
absolutely independent while\;overing political issues. Where the democracy tended to
be short-lived, as it happened in Russia, media's dependency on governmental policies in
politics has become inevitable. Nevertheless, the degree of being "not free from various
controls" is different in all the three cases of Poland, Ukraine and Russia. Media are
independent in Poland, their independence is limited in Ukraine, and the press is not free
in Russia.
The outcomes of this research proved my expectations that the vigorous civil society is
a key factor in the media independence, since it creates the necessary socio-cultural
I

• ·•, ,

environment for the emergence of the free press. The_ institutionalization of civil society
significantly narrows the government's possibilities to control the media. From this
standpoint, I found the number of the NGOs not to be an appropriate measurement of the
success of civil society. On th� contrary, the effectiveness of the civic groups' activities
and the society's capability' to be self-organized are seen as such measurements. If they
result in the democratic break-through in the cou�try's history this indicates the
development of its civil society. The voluntary groups are the most numerous in Russia,

,,

their number is the least in Ukraine, but the role of the Russian independent organizations
in participatory behaviors of the citizenry is hardly comparable to the same of Poland or
Ukraine. Unlike Russia,' these countries experienced the democratic revolutions.
Though in Ukraine public concern about freedom of press is not significant enough, the
'

.

case of Ukraine has more in common with Poland, than with Russia. Ukrainian society
demonstrated broad mass support for the opposition and high level of self-organization

,I .:
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during the Orange revolution m 2004. Meanwhile, the Russian society has never
experienced a sin:iilar. process, which eliminates its role as the facilitator of the
independent j oumalism.
The results of the study provided enough evidence that legislation cannot be viewed
as the determinant of the press freedom. Given the high level of media-freedom in
Poland, I expected its legislation to be most friendly towards the outlets but it tended to
be the most severe in terms ofpunitive actions. Nevertheless, the Polish laws differ from
the Ukrainian and- Russian legal acts in two significant aspects. First, they pose less
number of restrictions for the access to information. Second, they almost exclude the
state from the media-ownersliip6 and provide the legal framework for the journalists to
become the owners of their outlets. While in Ukraine the similar changes to the media�

.

'

.

law are only in the stage of discussion, and Russian laws emphasize the state's role as the
media-owner whose policy towards the outlets obtained the least democratic aspects.

'

,

The research shows thaf the successful economic performance has a limited
explanatory power of the media-freedom. In all three countries the economic
development determined the rapid growth of the media-markets, but only in the case of
Poland the rise of the number of outlets contributed to their independence. In Ukraine and
Russia the media · cannot operate so freely since the environment is dominated by
overbearing political and economic interests. Particularly in Russia the economic
performance is not related to the press independence s1nce the economic progress began
later than the development ·o� the media-industry. The already established system of
,

'

political control over the Ru�iian media cannot be changed by the influence of economy.
This leads to the conclusion that the variable of the economic performance can explain
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the media-freedom only through the interaction with the legislative mechanisms and civil
society. Where the history' o.f
the civic groups is long and successful, the economic
'·
. l

development becomes the yea,st for the independent press, as it happened in Poland.
Where the traditions of civil society are absent, the economic performance cannot
contribute to the media freedom.
The interaction of the mentioned independent variables provides the explanation of
the various degrees of the media's criticism towards the political figures in the
mainstream papers of Poland, Ukraine and Russia.
The research of the electi�n coverage shows that the observed papers already had

. .
their preferences among candi�ates before the official start of the election campai
'I

gn .

The

outlets set their agendas in a way to make public share' these preferences too. However, in
cases of Poland and Ukraim(, the outlets named three and two favorites respectively,
while there was only one in case of Russia. Eventually, Polish and Ukrainian media
audiences were in· more privileged positions than their Russian counterpart to evaluate
candidates and shape their voting decision.
The content-analyses of the newspapers' texts show that in none of the papers the
articles were devoid of the evaluation judginents. Generally, the use of such judgments
doe� not mean the initially �iased approach of the publications' authors towards the
candidates. It is legitimate and 'often even imperative to use the evaluation judgments in
political coverage. But the unequal distribution of such judgments, as well as their
attitudinal load, between the participants of the presidential races undermine the balance
of coverage.
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The quantity of the neutral texts in the Gazeta Wyborcha, the Den, and the Izvestiya
was diverse, which indicates the different degree of their impartiality. It is the highest in
case of the Polish paper, significantly lower in the Ukrainian, and the lowest in the
Russian. On the contrary, the degree of bias for and against candidates is the lowest in the

Gazeta Wyborcha, it is high in the Den, and the highest in the Izvestiya. Such results
reflect the development of p�}itical plurality in the country on the one hand and, on the
other, the level of media's independence from the external influences, particularly the
influences of the ruling elite. That is, the Gazeta Wyborcha appeared to be the most
objective among the observed cases, while the Izvestiya was the least. In this respect the

Den's position is closer to the same of the Izvestiya's: Ukrainian paper distributed even
less amount of coverage am.orig the candidates that were not the leaders of the campaign.
Nevertheless, almost the same amount of the neutral texts about the leading candidates
appeared in the Den. In b�,th the Den and the Izvestiya there was a significant
disproportion between the ·ne\'vs reporting and comments on the elections, while the

Ga�eta Wyborcha tried to collliterbalance the election coverage by applying more or less
equal amount of oifferent genres ofjournalism.
Consequently, the case of the Gazeta Wyborcha showed that the press could serve as
the instrument of the public c6ntrol over the leaders, only under condition of the absence
of the formal and informal ties with the top-actors. Where these ties are strong, like in
cases of the Den and the Izvestiya, the papers are not capable to perform their watch-dog
function.
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ENDNOTES
1. The data were taken fro:gi the Polish Portal Organizacyj Pozarzadowych (the Portal

-�-

of Nongovernmental Organizations): www.ngo.pl
2. Two cases have become the most famous. In 1994 the president Lech Walesa
attempted to forbid granting of license to the broadcaster that he did not like. Walesa
counted on the support of Marek Mazurkiewich, the chair of the National Council of
Radio and Television. , whom he had appointed to this position. However, the chair
refused to obey saying that otherwise he would violate the principles of the media ethics.
Mazurkiewich granted the license to the broadcaster. After that the chair was dismissed
by the president. The caie/of firing was referred to the Constitutional Tribunal, its
decision was that the chair of the Council was not removable. However, Walesa's
lawyers won, the .battle arguing that the law does not act retroactively. Nevertheless, the
president could not withdraw the license from the broadcaster. Within the 1990s the
National Council was among the institutions that enjoyed the highest public respect.

'

Another case concerns. the dispute between Lech Walesa and Adam Michnik, the
editor of the Gazeta Wyborcha. The paper sharply criticized the president for his policies
against the former colleagues· from Solidarity. In response, Walesa tried to fire Michnik
but succeeded only in taking'��ck the Solidarity's logo - "There is no freedom without
solidarity" -from the paper's front page.
3. The Freedom House ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7 in which 1 indicates the
highest level of de�ocratic progress, and 7 represents the lowest.
4. The ratings of the Economic Freedom Network "Free the World" are based on a zero
to ten scale, with ten been most free and zero the least.
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5. Rybkin withdrew his candidacy from the race three weeks before the election
explaining that he did not want to participate "in the farce" as he called the campaign.
This decision was preceded by the disappearance of Rybkin under the mysterious
circumstances in February ,2004, a day after he accused the president Putin's
administration of complicity in the 1999 terrorists attacks in Moscow. Later Rybkin
stated that his disappearance "';as not voluntary.
I.

6. The local governments in Poland publish about 40% of the local press, the local
public is considered to be the owner of these outlets. The powiat - the local self
government - and the voyevodztvo - the regional i;elf-government - created according
to the administrative reform, can not interfere into the editorial policy of the press. The
self-governments' official information is published in the papers in accordance to the
agreements between the editorial staffs and local governments, usually certain limited
area of the newspaper's page i& given to such kind of information.

'·
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